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Abstract
Attention is a facet of cognition that is responsible for the development of most
cognitive processes. Insult to the brain prior to or during the development of attention
can be detrimental to various aspects of cognitive development and, as a result, to a
child’s ability to acquire new knowledge and skills. One example of cerebral insult in
childhood is stroke. Given the importance of attention for the development of cognitive
skills, identifying the factors of attention is critical to understanding cognitive outcomes
in children with stroke.
In the present investigation, a three-factor and a four-factor model of attention
were tested using confirmatory factor analysis on a set of neuropsychological tests
purported to measure various aspects of attention, in order to determine the model of
attention best represented by a sample of children with arterial ischemic stroke. It was
determined that both a three- and four-factor model of attention fit the data equally well
when the same measures were included in both models. Despite similarities between the
models, the four-factor model of attention was argued to be the best fit, due to theoretical,
neuroanatomical, and developmental considerations. When the four-factor model was
used to determine predictors of outcome, both Age at Stroke and Age at Testing were
significant predictors of outcome on the Shift and Focus/Execute factors of attention, but
not on the Encode and Sustain factors. The findings are discussed within the framework
of a vulnerability vs. a plasticity model. Implications for clinical practice are also
considered.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Attention is a facet of cognition that is necessary for the development of many
other cognitive processes. Although attention is often referred to as a singular process, it
is in fact recognized as consisting of a network of inter-related processes. Several models
of attention exist, but all have limited application to children. Identifying a representative
model of attention is particularly important for understanding how attention is affected by
early cerebral insult. Children who experience an acquired brain injury typically have a
variety of cognitive sequelae as a result, among which difficulty with attention is often a
primary concern. Impairment in attention has been relevant in research investigating the
cognitive consequences of acquired brain injuries, including pre-frontal lesions, treatment
with cranial radiation and chemotherapy, as well as stroke (Anderson, Jacobs, & Harvey,
2005; Anderson, Godber, Smibert, Weiskop, & Ekert, 2004; Westmacott, MacGregor,
Askalan, & deVeber, 2009). The challenge with assessing attention in children is that
there is currently no clear developmental model of attention.
In the current investigation, a model of attention is identified for children with
paediatric arterial ischemic stroke (AIS) by testing two of the most commonly accepted
models of attention from the literature. Predictors of outcomes on the individual factors
of attention are also investigated in order to add to the understanding of the development
of attentional abilities. In the following introductory section, an overview of attention
models is presented, including an explanation of the factors of attention within a
developmental framework. Next, a brief overview of paediatric stroke is outlined,
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describing how cognitive processes, including attention, are commonly affected in this
population. Factors contributing to differential outcomes in children are also considered.
Attention Overview
Posner and Rothbart (2007) provide a broad definition of attention, stating that it
“serves as a basic set of mechanisms that underlie our awareness of the world and the
voluntary regulation of our thoughts and feelings.” (p. 6). Attentional networks are
connected to all other neural networks, and play a major role in the development of
different cognitive abilities (Posner & Rothbart, 2007). Research on brain maturation has
long suggested that cerebral and cognitive development are intertwined; they develop
through a nonlinear process of stages, where periods of growth are separated by plateaus
of limited change (Hudspeth & Pribram, 1990). Recent imaging research has
demonstrated that more basic functions (e.g., sensory and motor processes) mature earlier
in life with the development of sensorimotor cortices, while the association cortices
responsible for more complex processes (e.g., prefrontal cortex) develop later in life
(Casey, Tottenham, Liston, & Durston, 2012).
Cerebral and cognitive maturation also appear to influence each other in a
reciprocal manner, whereby cerebral growth can affect cognitive outcome and cognitive
development can, in turn, produce cerebral growth (Hudspeth & Pribram, 1990). The act
of attending to a stimulus changes brain activity by increasing the neural processing in
the areas involved in the responses to stimuli (Colombo, 2004); for example, as an
individual attends to a visual stimulus, neural activity in the visual cortex is enhanced.
Attention has a direct, and somewhat disproportionate, influence on outcomes of the
physical structure of the brain and its functions. Attending to different stimuli, either
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repeatedly or over extended periods of time, during early maturation has a direct and
significant influence on the development of specific neural regions and their related
cognitive processes (Colombo, 2004). In addition, attention may influence the
development of other cognitive abilities by mediating the brain’s interaction with various
experiences and different environments (Colombo, 2004).
Basic attention skills can be assessed very early in young infants (Posner, 2004)
and are likely present from birth. Early attentional abilities appear to have a direct
influence on the outcomes of other cognitive abilities (Richards, 2004). Some
investigators have measured attention skills in infants, and have suggested that early
attentional abilities are a good indicator of general intellectual functioning later in life
(Colombo, 1993). Children’s brains may be more vulnerable to attention deficits than
those of adults, given that their immature brains are in the process of developing and
cognitive skills are only beginning to emerge (Anderson, Anderson, & Anderson, 2006).
An inability to attend appropriately, in a child with a cortical impairment, may
subsequently affect the acquisition of new skills in other cognitive domains, resulting in a
global impairment in cognitive skills (Anderson et al., 2006). Overall, attention appears
to be one of the most fundamental processes involved in cognitive development. There
are, however, a variety of theories regarding the factors of attention and the network of
brain regions responsible for different aspects of attentional processing.
Factors of Attention
Several different types of attention have been identified and relied on in research
and clinical practice. Selective attention is considered the ability to focus on a specific
target stimulus, regardless of its location in space and despite competing stimuli.
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Selective attention processes are considered to be mediated by temporal, parietal, and
striatal regions of the brain (Posner & Cohen, 1984). Sustained attention is considered
the ability to attend to a stimulus or set of events that occur over an extended period of
time; this aspect of attention is also known as vigilance (Stuss, Shallice, Alexander, &
Picton, 1995). A right lateral midfrontal system has been attributed to the process of
sustained attention (Posner & Petersen, 1990).
In attention research, it is also considered valuable to acknowledge processing
speed as a form of executive-level attention. There is no consistent definition of
processing speed used throughout the literature, although it is generally defined as the
rate at which tasks are completed. It is unclear whether or not all speeded tasks tap into
the same type of cognitive processes (e.g., attention), nor whether speed of processing is
more a measure of the rate of input or output of information (Shanahan et al., 2006).
Regardless of the difficulty in pinpointing a clear definition, processing speed appears to
have a significant influence on the ability to effectively attend to stimuli and thus acquire
new information. The connection between processing speed and attention has been
identified in research on Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), noting
impairment in processing speed in this population of children (see Shanahan, 2006 for a
review). Processing speed is thought to be mediated by subcortical and anterior brain
regions (Anderson et al., 2006).
Attention often falls under the broader heading of executive functioning, making
the two concepts difficult to tease apart (Mirsky, Anthony, Duncan, Ahearn, & Kellam,
1991). There is quite a bit of overlap among measures of attention and what is
considered executive functioning, therefore typical measures of attention and measures of
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executive functioning that rely on attention are often both examined within the same
body of literature (Mirsky et al., 1991). Executive aspects of attention are sometimes
referred to as attentional control (Manly et al., 2001). The three primary executive-level
attention processes are: 1) response inhibition, which is the process of inhibiting
automatic responses to specific stimuli; 2) divided attention, which is the ability to attend
to multiple stimuli simultaneously; and 3) shifting attention, which is the ability to
change the focus of attention easily from one stimulus to another. These executive-level
attention processes are thought to be mediated primarily by the frontal lobes (Anderson et
al., 2006).
Models of Attention
Although individual researchers tend to argue that there are different attentional
domains (such as those mentioned previously) the most widely accepted models suggest
that the concept of attention can be divided into separate factors of attention (Heaton et
al., 2001). Most researchers agree that attention is mediated by a distributed neural
network, made up of multiple anatomical regions (Mirsky et al., 1991; Posner &
Petersen, 1990). The exact neural structures and the extent of their participation in the
attention process, however, are greatly debated.
Mirsky was one of the first researchers who attempted to establish cognitive
constructs and behavioural outcomes related to specific brain regions (Koziol, Joyce, &
Wurglitz, 2014). His original four-factor model of attention consisted of sustained
attention, selective or focused attention, attention shift, and divided attention (Mirsky et
al., 1991). Since his original investigations, numerous researchers have supported his
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theory and conducted research within the four-factor model framework (e.g., Cooley &
Morris, 1990; Sergeant & Van der Meer, 1990).
In contrast, Posner originally proposed a dual-factor model of attention, controlled
by different neuroanatomical regions, which are interconnected and directly influence
one another. Posner argued that one aspect of attention involved in the model was
selective and shifting attention, which he suggested was controlled by the posterior
cortical regions, most notably the parietal lobes. The second aspect of attention was
thought to be involved primarily in higher-order functions, which were controlled by the
anterior system, including the prefrontal cortex (Posner & Petersen, 1990).
More recently, researchers have argued for more complex models of attention,
with multiple components that interact with one another. Posner reconsidered his
original attention model, suggesting a three-factor network that takes more of the
subtleties of attentional processes into account. Posner labeled the three factors:
Orienting, Alerting, and Executive Attention. Supporters of Posner’s three-factor model
have identified variants of a similar structure (e.g., Manly et al., 2001; Anderson et al.,
2005; Anderson et al., 2006), labelling the three factors: 1) Focus/Select, 2)
Sustain/Vigilance, and 3) Attentional Control/Switching/Shifting/Response
Inhibition/Divide/Processing Speed.
Kavros and colleagues (2008) compared and contrasted Posner’s three-factor and
Mirsky’s four-factor models of attention and suggested that, despite some overlap in the
neuroanatomical regions identified in the models, the researchers demonstrate very little
agreement with respect to the types of attention involved in those regions. The three- and
four-factor models will be delineated further in the following paragraphs.
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Posner’s Three-Factor Model of Attention. Posner and Petersen (1990) first
described attention as a network of separate neuroanatomical regions responsible for
individual attention networks, which they derived from an overview of studies examining
visual orientation, alertness and vigilance, as well as conscious signal detection in both
animals and adults with typical cognitive processes and acquired injuries (see Posner &
Petersen, 1990 for a review). Posner’s most recent description of the attentional network
model identifies three individual systems, described as Orienting, Alerting, and Executive
attention. Numerous studies have since followed, providing evidence in support of the
theory, further defining the three factors of attention (e.g., Posner & Fan, 2008; Posner &
Rothbart, 2007) and supporting the neuroanatomical correlates outlined by Posner,
through fMRI findings (Fan, McCandliss, Fossella, Flombaum, & Posner, 2005). In
addition, researchers have examined these factors in a developmental context, suggesting
that the attention networks rely on one another, with individual aspects of the attention
network developing at different stages over time (see Posner & Rothbart, 2007 for a
review).
Given the theoretical nature of Posner’s model of attention, researchers have
developed an experimental task called the Attention Network Test (ANT), which is a
combination of a cue target and flanker test (based on Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974), and is
used in experimental settings to examine the three attention networks using measures of
reaction time (Fan, McCandliss, Sommer, Raz, & Posner, 2002). The ANT has been
developed for use with both adults and children (Fan et al., 2002; Rueda et al., 2004). In
clinical practice traditional neuropsychological assessment measures can be used to
represent Posner’s three factors of attention.
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Although the terms used by Posner have changed throughout various versions of
the model, the theoretical basis of each factor has remained consistent over time. In the
most recent account of Posner’s model, the Orienting attention network is responsible for
responding to changes in the perceptual field or sensory cues, by disengaging from a
stimulus, shifting attention, and engaging in a new stimulus (Mezzacappa, 2004). Posner
(1980) suggested that these responses can either be overt or covert orientations to a
stimulus, given that an individual can orient attention without overtly making eye
movements towards the stimulus. Orienting attention appears to be controlled by the
frontal eye field, superior parietal lobe, temporoparietal junction, pulvinar, and the
superior colliculus (Posner & Fan, 2008; Posner & Rothbart, 2007).
In order to assess Posner’s Orienting attention, researchers have relied on
neuropsychological tests requiring the individual to direct their attention to a cued
location, such as cancellation tasks or the Trail Making Test (Kavros et al., 2008). In the
process of developing the Test of Everyday Attention for Children (TEA-Ch), Manly and
colleagues (2001) determined that the Sky Search subtest correlates with the Trail
Making Test, representing what the authors termed Focused or Selective attention, which
maps onto Posner’s Orienting attention.
Posner’s Alerting attention is considered the process of maintaining a state of
vigilance or alert arousal during prolonged mental activity, which is mediated by the right
prefrontal and lateral parietal regions, the locus coeruleus, and the thalamus (Posner &
Fan, 2008; Posner & Raichle, 1994; Posner & Rothbart, 2007). Mezzacappa (2004)
further elaborates on Alerting attention, noting that it can also refer to a state of being
prepared for effortful information processing. In research, continuous performance and
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vigilance tasks have been used to evaluate Posner’s Alerting attention network (Fan et al.,
2002). As mentioned previously, Manly et al.’s (2001) Score! and Sky Search Dual Task
(SSDT) subtests of the TEA-Ch represent factors of sustained attention that map onto
Posner’s Alerting attention network.
Posner’s Executive Attention network involves a variety of processes related to
executing goal-directed behaviour, such as: planning; anticipating outcomes; selecting
among competing responses (i.e., conflict resolution); initiating, monitoring, and
maintaining behaviour; and interrupting or modifying behaviour (i.e., inhibiting
unwanted responses; Mezzacappa, 2004; Posner & Rothbart, 2007; Rueda et al., 2004).
The processes involved in Executive Attention are purported to be mediated by the
anterior cingulate gyrus, the lateral and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the ventral
tegmental area, as well as the basal ganglia (Posner & Rothbart, 2007; Posner & Raichle,
1994). Variations of the Stroop test have historically been used to assess conflict
resolution in research; the Stroop test is therefore considered a test of Executive Attention
(Posner & Rothbart, 2007).
Mirsky’s Four-Factor Model of Attention. Mirsky’s model of attention appears
to be primarily based on an “evolutionary developmental perspective” (Kavros et al.,
2008, p. 1571); Mirsky considers the ability to attend to stimuli a skill that is consistent in
all animals, and therefore particular neuroanatomical structures are considered to be
responsible for aspects of attention across species (Mirsky et al., 1991). The components
of Mirsky’s theory were initially empirically-derived through factor analysis of
neuropsychological test performance, compared to imaging data, in a typical sample of
adults and individuals with a variety of neurological or psychiatric diagnoses (i.e., eating
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disorder, epilepsy, schizophrenia, affective disorder, and head injury), as well as
typically-developing elementary school children. Mirsky’s model therefore provides a
framework for conceptualizing attention that corresponds with more traditional measures
of attention within clinical neuropsychology.
Mirsky’s Focus/Execute is the process of maintaining attention to a particular
stimulus despite distraction from competing stimuli, which has been recognized as a
feature of processing speed, given the rapid response output component of the attentional
process (Koziol et al., 2014). The inferior parietal lobe and corpus striatum are
considered to be responsible for both focusing and executing attention, whereas the
superior temporal cortex is involved in focusing attention alone (Mirsky, 1996; Mirsky et
al., 1991). Mirsky suggests that performance on the Coding and Digit- Symbol
Substitution subtests from the Wechsler scales, the Trail Making Test (parts A and B), the
Stroop test, and cancellation tests, are all mediated by the Focus/Execute process of
attention (Mirsky, 1996). Some investigators have used the Wechsler Symbol Search
task as a measure of Focus/Execute (Koziol et al., 2014).
Although the more complex version of the Trail Making Test (Trails B) is defined
as a test of cognitive flexibility (see Appendix A for a description), and is traditionally
clinically relied upon as a measure of executive functioning, Trails B did not load with
the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) on Mirsky’s Shift factor in the original factor
analysis (Mirsky et al., 1991). Despite the executive component necessary to complete
the task (i.e., switching between stimuli, inhibiting unwanted responses), when
examining time to completion as the measure of interest, Trails B is more a test of
speeded control of attention than shifting attention (Koziol et al., 2014).
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Sustain represents the process of maintaining vigilance, which Mirsky describes
as the ability to maintain focus and alertness over time. Structures of the brainstem –
including the tectum and mesopontine regions of the reticular formation – are suggested
to be responsible for Sustain, along with thalamic nuclei. These brainstem and thalamic
regions are the more evolutionarily primitive of the brain structures, which explains why
they are responsible for the most basic of the attention processes (Mirsky, 1996; Mirsky
et al., 1991). In establishing the original model, Mirsky relied on subscales of the
Continuous Performance Test (CPT; Rosvold & Delgado, 1956) to assess Sustain,
including number of correct hits, number of commission errors, and reaction time. In
developing the TEA-Ch, Manly and colleagues (2001) identified several subtests that
represent sustained attention, including Score! and Sky Search Dual Task (SSDT).
Shift is described as the ability to move attention from one stimulus or part of a
stimulus to another. Mirsky and colleagues suggested that Shift is related to the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, based on Milner’s work (1963), as well as the medial
frontal cortex and anterior cingulate gyrus, as evidenced through their animal models
(Mirsky et al., 1991). The WCST is relied on to assess Mirsky’s Shift factor (Mirsky,
1996). In their original model, Mirsky and colleagues included the number of categories
successfully achieved, the numbers of errors made, and the number of correct responses
(Mirsky, 1996) as indicators of attentional shifting. Mirsky recognized that Shift is also a
feature of executive functioning, acknowledging that there is no clearly defined
distinction between attention and executive functioning (Mirsky, 1996).
Encode is a process similar to the concept of working memory, involving the act
of holding and manipulating information in mind (Mirsky, 1996). Mirsky relied on the
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Digit Span and Arithmetic subtests from the Wechsler scales to assess Encode. In more
recent research, investigators have relied on measures of immediate memory (e.g.,
sentence repetition, the first trial of a list-learning task, or immediate story recall) as
measures of Mirsky’s Encode (Koziol & Budding, 2009). Mirsky and his colleagues
argued that the hippocampus and amygdala (both subcortical structures) are responsible
for Encode, based on Scoville and Milner’s (1957) as well as Mishkin’s (1978) research
demonstrating that these areas may be involved in the mnemonic or encoding aspects of
language (Mirsky, 1996; Mirsky et al., 1991). More recently Koziol et al. (2014)
suggested that the neuroanatomical substrates of Encode are much more widespread in
the brain than previously thought, and they make up a network that includes
neuroanatomical structures connected through the Fronto-Parietal Network (FPN),
including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the inferior parietal lobe, the anterior
cingulate cortex, the cerebellum, and the medial occipital cortex.
In a 1995 book chapter, Mirsky reported that he and his colleagues had identified
a fifth factor of attention, which was referred to as Stability, and represented the
consistency of responses to a target stimulus. Mirsky suggested that this factor of
attention was linked to Sustain, and the brain regions responsible for both factors likely
overlapped. Mirsky reported that this factor of attention could be assessed by examining
an individual’s consistency of responses across trials of the CPT. Although Stability is
mentioned in subsequent articles written by Mirsky (e.g., Mirsky, Pascualvaca, Duncan,
& French, 1999), there was no published research demonstrating how the fifth factor of
attention was developed; references suggested that the work was made available through
an unpublished dissertation. Due to the limited availability of evidence supporting the
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existence of the factor, and the fact that a single subtest was identified as a measure this
type of attention, the current investigation will not consider the fifth factor of attention.
From this point on, Mirsky’s original four-factor model of attention will be evaluated.
Kavros et al. (2008) compared Mirsky’s and Posner’s models of attention. They
noted that there are only a few theoretical similarities between the two models: Mirsky’s
Focus/Execute factor most closely resembles a combination of Posner’s Alerting and
Orienting networks of attention. Mirsky’s Shift appears to resemble the Orienting
attention network described by Posner, given that Orienting refers primarily to the visual
fields and shifting eye movements; however, Mirsky’s Shift also relates to shifting
between concepts. Kavros and colleagues reported limited overlap between Mirsky’s
Encode and Sustain factors and Posner’s model of attention. Overall, the researchers
reported that the two theories take different theoretical approaches to classifying the
underlying components of attention.
Despite differences in opinion regarding the types of attention that exist, and to
what extent attention overlaps with other cognitive processes, all theorists appear to be in
agreement with the fact that attention is not a unitary cognitive ability (Stuss et al., 1995).
Different aspects of attention are developed over time and interact with the mastery of
other cognitive processes. The age of a child at the time of the cerebral insult is a critical
piece of information when considering how different cognitive abilities will be affected
by a particular lesion.
Developmental Theories of Attention. In a review of the history of
developmental neuropsychology, Morgan & Ricker (2008) suggested that first attempts at
understanding paediatric neuropsychology focused on a top-down approach, using adult
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models to help represent outcomes in children with acquired injuries. The authors
suggested that the push toward a “child-up” approach to studying paediatric
neuropsychology has been a long time coming. Research focusing on the factors of
attention described previously suggests that individual components of attention vary in
the rate at which they are first acquired and they are also mastered at different
developmental stages. Despite varying ages at which certain skills are acquired, children
in general tend to show increases in the development of all aspects of attention between
the ages of 8 to 10 years (McKay, Halperin, Schwartz, & Sharma, 1994).
When examining the developmental aspects of Posner’s attention processes,
Orienting attention appears to be one of the earliest attentional processes to develop and
become established in children. Infants as young as 3 to 4 months of age can be taught to
orient to places in the environment, and this can be accomplished without moving their
eyes (Colombo, 2004; Rothbart & Posner, 2001). Typically, the ability to disengage,
shift, and re-engage attention to a new stimulus is present by 6 to 9 months of age in most
individuals (Colombo, 2004; Posner & Raichle, 1994). Rueda et al. (2004) reported that
Orienting attention continues to develop until 6 years of age when it can be considered
mastered; however, voluntary orienting of attention (i.e., goal-directed behaviour) is
argued to continue developing into adolescence (Posner & Raichle, 1994). Similarly,
Rueda et al. (2004) found that Alerting attention is present by the age of 3 months, but
suggested that this aspect of attention continues to develop into adolescence.
On the other hand, Executive Attention appears to have a relatively late
development. Rueda et al. (2004) suggested that particular aspects of Executive
Attention may be established at different points throughout an individual’s development.
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For example, Rueda et al. (2004) found that conflict resolution begins to develop around
2 to 4 years of age, and by the age of 10 years children obtain scores that are equivalent
to those of adults. Inhibition, on the other hand, does not appear to begin to develop until
between 6 and 13 years. Rueda et al. (2004) suggested that age 7 years is a reasonable
cutoff for Executive Attention to be considered established overall.
Researchers have investigated the development of some aspects of attention that
are considered to be equivalent to Mirsky’s factors of attention. Several aspects of
attention fall under the general umbrella of Mirsky’s Focus/Execute factor; these
processes have been investigated separately. McKay et al. (1994) found that children
tend to have early development of selective attention, and are able to master the skill by
the age of 6 years. Processing speed, on the other hand, tends to show a gradual
development throughout childhood, increasing steadily with age (Anderson, Anderson,
Northam, Jacobs, & Catroppa, 2001; McKay et al., 1994; Rueda et al., 2004).
Richards (2004) found that children tend to master the process of sustaining
attention within the first few months of infancy, and the skill appears to remain stable
throughout childhood (McKay et al., 1994). Rueda et al. (2004) found very little
difference between children and adults in terms of their ability to shift attention between
cues, but they noted that the ability to disengage from a particular stimulus improves with
age. Anderson et al. (2001) found that around the age of 15 years there is a “growth
spurt” for attention control and processing speed, aspects of attention measured through
tests of digit span (both forward and backward), which fall under Mirsky’s Encode factor.
Despite the extensive research that has been conducted on factors of attention and
attempts to understand how various attentional processes develop over time, there remain
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significant discrepancies among models of attention. In particular, there is a lack of
consensus regarding whether attention can be conceptualized as a three-factor or a fourfactor model. Identifying the factor structure of a model of attention that fits within a
developmental framework would provide a valuable tool to understanding the clinical
consequences of impairment to individual attentional processes, such as the outcomes of
attention following paediatric stroke.
Paediatric Stroke Overview
A stroke is a cerebrovascular event characterized by a sudden disturbance of
central nervous functioning caused by a disruption of blood supply in the brain. Ischemic
strokes occur when there is a disruption in the blood supply to a specific region of the
brain that lasts long enough to cause an infarct (i.e., death of the tissue; Blumenfeld,
2011). Ischemic strokes can be further subdivided into arterial ischemic stroke (AIS) and
cerebral sinovenous thrombosis (CSVT), depending on the location of the blockage
(Blumenfeld, 2011); ischemic strokes are therefore a result of either an embolism or
thrombosis (deVeber, MacGregor, Curtis, & Mayank, 2000). The most common location
of ischemic strokes in children is in the Middle Cerebral Artery (MCA), most often in the
left cerebral hemisphere (Raju, Nelson, Ferriero, & Lynch, 2007). Hemorrhagic strokes
refer to death of tissue due to either intracerebral or subarachnoid bleeding (AmlieLefond, Sébire, & Fullerton, 2008).
Paediatric stroke is an umbrella term, encompassing all cerebrovascular events
occurring from the prenatal period in utero to the age of 18 years. The term perinatal
stroke is used in literature to refer to a stroke that occurs during very early life.
According to the National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke (NINDS)
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perinatal strokes occur between 28 weeks of gestation and 28 days of life after birth
(Lynch, Hirtz, deVeber, & Nelson, 2002). Although the terms perinatal stroke and
neonatal stroke are often used interchangeably, by definition the term neonatal applies
exclusively to events that occur after birth. Because of the difficulty in reliably
establishing the timing of stroke onset during the neonatal period, the term perinatal
stroke is more encompassing and preferred by many authors (Amlie-Lefond et al., 2008).
From this point forward, the term perinatal will be used to refer to the pre- and post-natal
period, up to 28 days of life.
The NINDS has determined that a stroke occurring between 29 days and 18 years
of life is considered a childhood stroke (Lynch et al., 2002). In the stroke literature,
childhood strokes have been further subdivided into early childhood stroke (29 days to 5
years) and late childhood stroke (5 to 18 years; Westmacott, Askalan, MacGregor,
Anderson, deVeber, 2010).
The clinical presentation of paediatric stroke tends to be quite subtle and has a
wide range of possible symptoms (Lynch et al., 2002). Often, signs of perinatal stroke
do not become apparent until infants begin to move on their own and appear to favour
one limb over another (Hartel, Schilling, Sperner, & Thyen, 2004). When motor function
is spared, symptoms may not present until later in childhood, when demands on a child’s
complex cognitive skills are increased, such as language or problem-solving abilities
(Westmacott et al., 2009).
Prevalence
Given recent advances in neuroimaging, the identification of childhood strokes
has been increasing consistently since the 1970s. The most recent estimates suggest that
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approximately 5 to 8 in every 100 000 children will have a stroke, up to 50% of which
are ischemic (Agrawal, Johnston, Wu, Sidney, & Fullerton, 2009; Lynch et al., 2002).
Strokes are among the top 10 causes of death in children; the highest mortality rates due
to stroke are among those under 1 year of age (Lynch et al., 2002). Paediatric strokes are
more likely to occur during the perinatal period than any other period throughout
childhood; in fact, approximately 32% of paediatric AIS and 43% of paediatric CSVT
occur within the first 28 days of life (deVeber et al., 2000; deVeber et al., 2001). More
than 50% of children who survive paediatric strokes subsequently develop motor
difficulties (e.g., hemiparesis) and/or cognitive deficits (e.g., attention impairment; Lynch
et al., 2002).
The majority of the paediatric stroke literature has focused on ischemic strokes,
partly since the neonatal brain is particularly vulnerable to damage as a result of ischemia
(Lynch et al., 2002). A recent review has suggested that between 39% and 54% of
childhood strokes are hemorrhagic; although they remain an understudied half of the
paediatric stroke population (Warren, 2011). The current investigation will focus on
ischemic strokes, exclusively examining patients with AIS, due to the greater availability
of this population within the clinical sample.
Causes
Although the mortality rate in infants has been consistent over the past 40 years,
the causes of paediatric strokes have changed over time (Lynch et al., 2002). Prior to the
influenza vaccination, this virus was a common cause of strokes in children. More recent
analyses suggest that the most common known causes of paediatric stroke include:
congenital/acquired heart disease; sickle cell anemia; coagulation disorders; extracranial
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carotid dissection; varicella or other similar infections; trauma; Down’s or Williams’
Syndromes; and a wide range of other viruses and bacteria (Lynch et al., 2002; Kirkham,
1999). Despite the wide range of possible causes of paediatric stroke, in more than one
third of all cases, there is no evident source (Lynch et al., 2002).
Sex Differences
Paediatric strokes are more common in males than females, regardless of age at
stroke, type of stroke, or history of trauma (Golomb, Fullerton, Nowak-Gottl, & deVeber,
2009). Westmacott et al. (2009) found that males with perinatal AIS showed a more
significant cognitive impairment by the time they reached school age than a matched
group of females, in terms of overall intellectual ability, nonverbal reasoning, and
processing speed. This finding suggests that not only are males more likely to suffer
strokes, but they are more likely to experience emerging cognitive impairments
throughout development. The sex difference in cognitive outcomes may be explained by
the relative immaturity of the male brain at birth, compared to the female brain; the male
brain may thus be more susceptible to impairment following perinatal stroke (Westmacott
et al., 2009). See the following vulnerability theory explanation for an elaboration of this
idea.
Outcomes
Vulnerability vs. Plasticity Theories. An often debated question in paediatric
neuropsychology is whether or not earlier damage results in better outcomes than later
insult, given either the plasticity or vulnerability of the young brain. Theories appear to
fall along a spectrum; at one extreme is the theory of plasticity, which is the process by
which neural circuitry is modified in response to environmental impact or experience
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(Anderson, Spencer-Smith, & Wood, 2011). Based on her research with infant and adult
monkeys, Margaret Kennard (1938; 1942) suggested that functional reorganization of the
brain is greater following early injury, due to the plasticity of the young brain. She found
that adult monkeys tended to show greater impairment than infant monkeys following
comparable lesions (Kennard, 1938). Researchers who support what has been dubbed the
“Kennard Principle” argue that damage tends to be less severe and result in fewer
functional impairments following a focal brain injury in younger children, compared to
the results seen when the injury occurs in older children and adults. Proponents of the
theory of early brain plasticity suggest that the young brain may, in fact, be more
malleable in early life and able to reorganize more effectively than an older brain
(Anderson et al., 2005). As a result, one would expect better recovery following early
insult than might be seen in an older individual with that same injury.
On the other end of the spectrum is the theory of vulnerability. Hebb (1947)
found that children with frontal lobe injuries had worse outcomes and greater functional
impairment than adults following equivalent brain insult. Hebb hypothesized that early
cerebral insult might prevent the normal development of certain cognitive abilities, which
may result in impairment within particular cognitive domains. Young children whose
cognitive skills are not fully established at the time of insult may have trouble acquiring
those skills and will experience poorer recovery (Biltigua et al., 2004; Giza & Prins,
2006). Some argue that younger brains are less mature and are underdeveloped;
therefore the frontal regions and myelinated fibers in particular tend to be more
vulnerable to damage than a mature adult brain (Hudspeth & Pribram, 1990).
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Some proponents of the vulnerability theory have since suggested that there can
be a cumulative effect of early cerebral insult, sometimes referred to as a “snowball
effect” (McLinden, Baird, Westmacott, Anderson, & deVeber, 2007); not only do young
children have a very limited set of acquired skills at the time of the early injury, but
damage may also impair their ability to consolidate new skills in the future (Anderson,
Catroppa, Morse, Haritou, & Rosenfeld, 2005). Children with cerebral insults tend to
struggle more with complex cognitive processes as the demands of recovery exacerbate
the usual challenges of development (Dennis, 2000).
Recent evidence in stroke literature tends to support the theory of vulnerability
and age effects, demonstrating that the functional outcome of insult to a young brain may
be disproportionately affected by strokes compared to a more mature brain (Hartel et al.,
2004), especially in respect to cognitive functioning. For example, Hartel et al. (2004)
found that children with paediatric strokes show a general trend toward having a weaker
Performance Intelligence Quotient (PIQ) than Verbal Intelligence Quotient (VIQ) on
Wechsler Intellectual Scales (i.e., WPSSI, WISC, and WAIS), and the discrepancy is
significantly greater for children who have a stroke before the age of 5 years, during the
period when the brain is still in the early stages of development, than for children who
have an equivalent stroke after the age of 5 years. McLinden et al. (2007) found that
when significant intellectual deficits are present, they can be identified as early as 12 to
24 months post-stroke. Not only is younger age at stroke associated with poorer scores
on measures of intellectual functioning, but this trend is also present across a broad range
of cognitive domains, including: memory, language, visuospatial skills, and academic
functioning (Max, Bruce, Keatley, & Delis, 2010).
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Based on their studies of rat models, Kolb, Gibb, and Gorny (2000) believe that
there are “windows of opportunity” during which the best outcomes might occur
following cerebral insult, due to specific developmental periods during which the greatest
neural generation occurs. Kolb and colleagues (2000) suggested that the most severe
neurological deficits result from insults occurring during the perinatal period (i.e., the
gestational period up to the first month of life), as is evidenced through cases of cerebral
palsy; whereas the window for the best outcomes appears to be during the second year of
life (i.e., between 12 and 24 months).
In their research with paediatric stroke populations, Allman and Scott (2011)
found that when examining performance across a range of neuropsychological tests,
children who suffered a stroke between the ages of 1 to 6 years had relatively spared
performance, compared to greater impairment for children with stroke onset before the
age of 1 year or after the age of 6 years. This finding is consistent with Kolb’s argument
for critical periods of development, suggesting that both younger and older ages may be
associated with greater risk of impairment across cognitive domains.
Anderson et al. (2011) suggested that rather than choosing sides in the
vulnerability vs. plasticity debate, these processes should be considered along a
continuum of recovery potential, with plasticity and vulnerability as opposing processes
at the extremes of the spectrum. Anderson and her colleagues note that outcomes along
this continuum likely depend on a variety of contributing factors, including: injury factors
(e.g., age at injury, severity of insult); constitutional factors (e.g., genetic makeup, sex of
the child); and environmental factors (e.g., social status, access to rehabilitation).
Anderson et al. (2011; 2005) also suggest that early neural recovery does not always
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translate into behavioural (or functional) recovery. Behavioural recovery tends to differ
depending on the complexity of the ability in question and is based on both the ability to
implement compensatory strategies and the brain’s plasticity (i.e., its ability to
reorganize).
Neurological Outcomes. Neurological impairment and seizures occur in
approximately 50-75% of children with ischemic strokes (including both AIS and CSVT;
Raju et al., 2007). deVeber et al. (2000) found that over 41% of children with ischemic
strokes demonstrated moderate to severe deficits on neurological outcome measures.
Children with AIS tended to have worse outcomes than those with CSVT; “poor
outcome” was found in 46% of children with AIS and 18% with CSVT. deVeber et al.
(2000) also found that unilateral sensorimotor deficits were present in 57% of children
with AIS and 18% with CSVT. Speech, behavioural, and cognitive deficits, on the other
hand, were less common, only present in 15% of children with AIS and 11% with CSVT.
Seizures are a common symptom of ischemic stroke (Chabrier, Husson,
Dinomais, Landrieu, & Nguyen The Tich, 2011; Kirkham, 1999). When children show
signs of an early onset stroke (i.e., within the first 28 days of life), they are most likely to
present with seizures (Chabrier et al., 2011). Children who suffer from seizures
associated with early cerebral insult are more likely to have cognitive impairment, and
these deficits are likely to be more severe than in children with paediatric stroke who do
not experience recurring seizures, due to secondary functional impairments (Hartel et al.,
2004; Murias, Brooks, Kirton, & Iaria, 2014). For this reason, children with recurring
seizures are often excluded in research investigating the outcomes of paediatric strokes
(e.g., Westmacott et al.).
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Motor Outcomes. Hemiparesis is the most common clinical symptom of
unilateral stroke (Hogan, Kirkham, & Isaacs, 2000), and is often the first sign of stroke in
children who do not present with seizures (Kirkham, 1999). Most strokes occur in
regions of the brain where sensorimotor systems are represented, and therefore motor
difficulties are common and quite variable in paediatric stroke cases; symptoms may
include abnormal reflexes, tone asymmetry, action tremors, hemiparesis, and hemiplegia
(Hogan et al., 2000). Paresis (motor weakness) tends to be the most prevalent and
distressing motor outcome following paediatric stroke, especially in the perinatal stroke
group (Hartel et al., 2004); hemiparesis occurs in approximately 30% of children
following paediatric strokes (Ricci et al., 2008).
Cognitive Outcomes. There have been mixed results in the research attempting
to determine the extent to which children demonstrate cognitive impairment following
paediatric stroke (Hartel et al., 2004). Westmacott et al. (2009) found that children who
had unilateral AIS during the perinatal period were more likely to demonstrate
impairment in higher-level cognitive skills once they reached school age, even if they
showed no deficits during the toddler or preschool years. This finding suggests that
children with perinatal strokes tend to make slower cognitive gains than typicallydeveloping children. Alternatively, Ricci et al. (2008) found that children with perinatal
middle cerebral artery (MCA) strokes tended to have average IQ by their preschool years,
as long as they did not present with additional confounding features (e.g., parent with
cognitive impairment, developmental delays, etc.), which predisposed them to greater
cognitive impairment following paediatric stroke.
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Perhaps the discrepancies in results among studies can be related to the
populations being compared; children with paediatric stroke may not perform in a
significantly impaired range, but tend to show a lag in cognitive development, when
compared to the average child. In a large sample of children with unilateral AIS,
Westmacott et al. (2010) found that despite falling within the average range on all
subscales of the WISC, children with strokes had significantly lower scores overall when
compared to a normative group of children.
The global cognitive deficits present in children with paediatric stroke are quite a
contrast to the common consequences of strokes that occur later in life. Adults who
suffer strokes tend to experience very specific high-level cognitive impairments
following focal lesions. These most commonly include aphasia (language impairment),
amnesia (memory impairment), or apraxia (movement impairment; Vargha-Khadem,
Isaacs, & Muter, 1994). For example, in adults, speech/language impairments are
common following unilateral strokes localized to the left medial temporal lobe; however,
studies have consistently shown that children do not have the same pattern of deficits
following unilateral lesions (Vargha-Khadem et al., 1994; Mosch, Max, & Tranel, 2005).
In fact, researchers have found that there are no significant effects of lesion laterality in
cognitive outcomes following paediatric stroke (e.g., Hetherington, Tuff, Anderson,
Miles, & deVeber, 2005; Hogan, Kirkham, & Isaacs, 2000; Westmacott et al., 2010).
Children who have strokes tend to present with more generalized cognitive
impairments than adults with strokes to similar locations, who present with quite
localized impairments. Vargha-Khadem et al. (1994) reported that the consequences of
childhood strokes tend to be more widespread within the brain than similar injuries in

26
adults, which explains the lack of localized impairment. Vargha-Khadem and colleagues
(1994) suggested that there are two possible – yet opposing – explanations to support the
idea that insult tends to be less focal in children. The first is that damage to a particular
region can result in a decrease in potential for the acquisition of abilities within fully
intact associated regions, when the relationship between the two regions is necessary for
learning. This first explanation is consistent with the vulnerability theory, and would
suggest that early cerebral damage results in more global deficits. A second explanation
offered by Vargha-Khadem et al. (1994) is that the effects of focal lesions is less
pronounced in children due to the plasticity of the early developing brain, which can
compensate for the damaged regions and preserve function. The second explanation is
consistent with the plasticity theory, and would suggest that early cerebral damage results
in greater overall preservation of function across skills.
Not only do outcomes vary based on the age at which the stroke occurred, but the
location of lesions plays a role in the outcomes as well. Westmacott et al. (2010) found
that children with strokes affecting both cortical and subcortical regions of the brain had
poorer scores on IQ measures (WISC-III/-IV) than children with strokes occurring only
in either the cortical or the subcortical region. The researchers also noted that age of
stroke significantly affected performance on the WISC; however, this effect was
influenced by the location of the lesion. The children with earliest stroke onset (i.e., prior
to one month of age) had the poorest outcomes when the lesions were localized to the
subcortical regions; while children with strokes that occurred between the ages of 1
month and 5 years had the worst outcomes when their lesions involved only cortical
regions. In addition, the impact of lesion location and age at stroke depend on the
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cognitive domain being measured; for example, children tended to have greater
impairment in academic functioning following stroke than adults, while there was no
difference between the two groups in terms of memory ability (Mosch, Max, & Tranel,
2005).
The severity of lesions also plays a role in the outcome measures of paediatric
cerebral insult. Anderson, Jacobs, et al. (2005) found that for mild and moderate
childhood traumatic brain injury (TBI), sustained between 3 and 12 years of age, children
made significant recovery within the first 12 months post-injury. For more severe
injuries, children with earlier insult (i.e., age 3-7 years) made poorer gains than children
who had suffered similar injuries later in childhood (i.e., 8-12 years; Anderson, Jacobs, et
al., 2005). There appears to be a “double hazard” effect of the combination of severe
injury and younger age leading to the poorest outcomes (Anderson, Catroppa, et al.,
2005). Similarly, paediatric stroke research has noted lesion severity as a contributing
factor of poorer cognitive outcome (e.g., Banich, Levine, Kim, & Huttenlocher, 1990).
However, conclusions based on TBI research may not be generalizable to stroke patients,
due to the less focal nature of TBI compared to stroke.
Behavioural and Emotional Outcomes. There have been conflicting results in
research related to the behavioural and emotional consequences of paediatric stroke (see
Hartel et al., 2004 for a review). Children do not tend to show behavioural outcomes
similar to those demonstrated in adults with unilateral cerebral insults, such as deficits in
emotional expression following right hemisphere injury or increased risk for depression
following left cerebral insult (Hartel et al., 2004). Some studies have identified
impairment in social skills, emotional expression, irritability, and hyperactivity in
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children with a history of stroke (Hartel et al., 2004). However, interpreting these
findings is complicated by research demonstrating the impact of psychosocial factors on
behavioural outcomes. Laucht et al. (2000) demonstrated that children with behavioural
consequences following early cerebral insults in general (e.g., aggression, delinquency,
etc.), tend to also have negative psychosocial risk factors such as early family adversity
present at birth (e.g., maternal depression). These psychosocial adversities into which
children are born tend to outweigh any influence that early cerebral insult will have on
behavioural consequences (Laucht et al., 2000).
Max et al. (2002b) found that children who have had a stroke are at greater risk
for experiencing a comorbid psychiatric disorder, even when controlling for a variety of
related factors, such as: age, gender, socioeconomic status, race, family functioning,
family history of psychiatric disorder, and comorbid medical conditions. The researchers
found that protective factors included: average intellectual functioning of the child; a
typical neurological exam (i.e., no comorbid seizures, hemiparesis, coordination
difficulty, etc.); and a limited family psychiatric history (Max et al., 2002b).
Although there appears to be a general consensus within the adult literature about
the outcomes following localized infarcts, there is no clear understanding of how a
child’s brain is affected by a stroke. There is continued debate over whether the young
brain is more susceptible to injury than an older brain (i.e., vulnerability theory) or is
more available for reorganization and preservation of function (i.e., plasticity theory),
given the varying outcomes that have been identified in children following early acquired
brain injuries. Throughout the literature, the consensus appears to be that neurological,
motor, cognitive, behavioural, and emotional outcomes are influenced by a wide range of
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factors, including the timing, severity, and location of the lesion, as well as comorbid
medical conditions and psychosocial risk factors.
Attention Deficits Following Paediatric Stroke
Despite the wide range of possible neurological, behavioural, and emotional
outcomes that may result from paediatric strokes, an area of increasing interest in the
field has been on the impact that cerebrovascular insults have on cognitive abilities, and
attention, in particular. In the past decade, researchers have highlighted a specific need
for more a comprehensive neuropsychological profile to be developed – including a more
in-depth assessment of cognitive functioning – following paediatric strokes (Max et al.,
2005). Researchers have identified attention disturbances in paediatric stroke patients,
across a variety of different investigative approaches. In the past, researchers have
examined individual cognitive measures, to assess outcomes of attention following
paediatric stroke. Aram & Ekelman (1986) found that task persistence on the Freedom
From Distractibility index of the WISC-R (i.e., the sum of scores on the arithmetic and
digit span subtests) was impaired following right-sided focal lesions. Block, Nanson, &
Lowry (1999) found divided attention impairment on the Symbol-Digit Modalities Test
for children with left-sided focal lesions.
Max et al. (2004) examined performance on the Starry Night task (Rizzo &
Robin, 1990), a test designed specifically to tap into Posner’s factors of Orienting and
Alerting attention. The researchers found impairment on this test for individuals who had
focal lesions to the Orienting or Alerting network regions identified by Posner, while no
significant impairment was found on this test for children with lesions of the Executive
Attention network (Max et al., 2004). MRI findings were relied on to pinpoint the
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Orienting network (bilateral parietal lobes, bilateral thalamus, and bilateral precentral
gyri), the Alerting network (right inferior parietal lobe, right precentral and superior
frontal gyri, and right thalamus), and the Executive Attention network (bilateral anterior
cingulum, posterior cingulum, superior frontal gyrus, paracentral lobule, caudate,
lentiform, and claustrum). In this investigation, attention deficits tended to be more
severe for children identified in the early stroke group (i.e., onset of stroke before 12
months of age) compared to the late stroke group (i.e., onset at 12 months of age or
older), regardless of the size of the lesion (Max et al., 2004).
Although some researchers have examined specific cognitive measures of
attention (Aram & Ekelman, 1986; Block et al., 1999; Max et al., 2004), a common
research approach in this area of study is to focus on behavioural measures of attention,
such as those consistent with Attention Deficit (Hyperactivity) Disorder (ADD/ADHD).
Given the limited consistency in terms of the measurement tools used in attention
research, there tends to be some confusion over the definition of attention within the
literature (see Kavros et al., 2008 for a review). The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (5th ed.; DSM–5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013) definition
of ADD/ADHD states that an individual has symptoms of inattention (e.g., makes
careless mistakes, is easily distracted, has difficulty sustaining attention) and/or
hyperactivity-impulsivity (e.g., fidgets, talks excessively, interrupts) that are present prior
to the age of 12 years and that occur in two or more settings (e.g., school, home, work).
This disorder is usually diagnosed through parent or teacher report.
A common behavioural questionnaire used to make a diagnosis of ADD/ADHD is
the Conners (3rd ed.; Conners 3; Conners, 2008). Other measures of behaviour that can
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contribute to a differential diagnosis of ADHD include: the Behavioural Rating Inventory
of Executive Function (BRIEF; Gioia, Isquith, Guy, & Kenworthy, 2000), a measure
designed to assess executive function behaviours, which includes measures of
behavioural regulation and metacognition; and the Behaviour Assessment System for
Children, Second Edition (BASC-2; Reynolds & Kamphaus, 2004), a measure designed
to assist in differential diagnoses of disorders (i.e., ADHD, Depression, etc.) that includes
internalizing and externalizing behaviour scales.
In their research, Max and his colleagues have investigated ADD/ADHD
symptoms in relation to lesions acquired specifically to brain regions identified in
Posner’s Executive Attention network. Max et al. (2002a) found behavioural expression
of attention deficits and symptoms consistent with ADHD in paediatric stroke patients
with lesions of the putamen. In a later study, Max et al. (2005) found similar outcomes in
children with stroke lesions localized to the mesial prefrontal and orbital frontal regions.
A concern with focusing on post-stroke ADD/ADHD symptoms is that cognitive
test batteries are not designed to assess the behaviours required for a diagnosis of
ADD/ADHD, nor are they specific to any one behavioural disorder; therefore,
neuropsychological tests are not recommended as diagnostic tools for identifying
ADD/ADHD (Swanson et al., 2004). Children diagnosed with ADD/ADHD tend not to
show deficits on standardized cognitive measures of inhibition or other executive
functioning measures (Shanahan et al., 2006). In fact, criteria in the DSM-5 for
diagnosing ADD/ADHD are based on behavioural impairment, as observed by parents,
teachers, or the clinician, and not on any cognitive measures of attention/executive
functions. As Kavros et al. (2008) state, ADD/ADHD “is a subjective report of observed
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behavior... it is not synonymous with attention impairment” (p. 1571). Children with
strokes who are involved in studies of attention are therefore being labelled with
ADD/ADHD-type symptoms based on their scores on behavioural self-report measures
and observation; cognitive attention impairments are not being taken into account. Given
that attention impairments identified through cognitive testing have consistently been
reported for children with other acquired cerebral insults (e.g., Anderson et al., 2005;
Anderson et al., 2006; Catroppa, Anderson, & Stargatt, 1999), it is important to turn the
focus of research towards test-based measures of attention.
Despite the extensive research conducted over the years, aiming to provide a
better understanding of attentional processes, the current literature lacks a consistent
model through which to understand the development of the attention network. Given the
nature of paediatric strokes, such that the timing of an insult can often be pinpointed,
children with strokes make up a valuable population for research; children with a history
of stroke can be relied on to investigate the development of attention over time, by
examining the consequences of cerebrovascular injuries at various stages in development.
Purpose of the Current Investigation
Given that there is no universally-accepted model of attention in the cognitive
literature, the purpose of the present investigation was to determine whether a threefactor or a four-factor model of attention is best represented by a sample of children with
arterial ischemic stroke (AIS). Neuropsychological assessment measures of attention are
included in the current investigation, chosen based on their presence in the original
models of attention being compared, as well as their psychometric properties, with regard
to the aspects of attention each test is purported to measure. In addition, developmental
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aspects of the model of attention will be examined, taking into account how a child’s age
at the time of their stroke (Age at Stroke) and age at the time that they were assessed
(Age at Testing) can be used as predictors of outcome on the factors of attention in the
model of choice.
Goals
1. To determine whether a three-factor or four-factor model of attention best
represented attentional processes in children from a clinical sample of arterial
ischemic stroke (AIS). To fulfill the primary goal of this investigation, the
factors of attention confirmed by factor analysis were used to determine which
theory of attention best described outcomes following paediatric AIS. It was
expected that if a three-factor model of attention best describes attention in the
clinical sample, the data would fit well in a model with three major factors of
attention that correspond with the following types of attention: 1) Orient/Select;
2) Alert/Sustain/Vigilance; and 3) Executive Attention. If a four-factor model of
attention best describes attention in the clinical sample, the data was expected to
fit well in a model with four major factors of attention that correspond with the
following types of attention: 1) Focus/Execute; 2) Sustain; 3) Shift; and 4)
Encode.
2. To determine whether Age at Stroke or Age at Testing are significant predictors
of outcome on factors of attention, based on the model selected in Goal #1. To
fulfill the second goal, a full latent variable model was developed based on the
chosen model from Goal #1. Age at Stroke and Age at Testing were included in
the model as predictors of outcome on the factors of attention in separate
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regression models. In addition, Age at Stroke was included as a predictor of
outcomes on factors of attention when Age at Testing was controlled for. Age at
Testing was subsequently included as a predictor of outcomes on factors of
attention when Age at Stroke was controlled for.
CHAPTER 2
General Methods
Participants
All data were collected retrospectively. Participants were selected from the
Children’s Stroke Outcome Study sample at the Hospital for Sick Children in Toronto,
Ontario. This study was approved by the Research Ethics Board at the Hospital for Sick
Children and, at the time of testing, consent was obtained from all participants or their
caregivers for clinical data to be used in future research. All children being treated by the
Paediatric Stroke Clinic who are referred for a neuropsychological assessment are asked
to participate in the ongoing outcome study.
Participants who met inclusion criteria for the current investigation were born
between 1977 and 2006, with a history of stroke diagnosed before the age of 18 years,
who had received at least one of the measures of interest, including an intelligence test,
before the age of 25 years. For a graphical representation of Age at Stroke across
participants in the current investigation, see Appendix B. A breakdown of Age at Stroke
across the tests of interest can be found in Appendix C. Data from 291 children who
were tested on or before October 2011 were originally collected from the database.
Children with hemorrhagic or cerebral sinovenous thrombosis (CSVT) were excluded
from the present investigation due to the relative scarcity within the given sample, and
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potential for differing clinical presentation. Based on radiographic report, an event was
classified as AIS by an experienced paediatric neurologist if definite evidence of vascular
focal infarction was present. In an attempt to limit the extent to which a combination of
neurological conditions might influence the outcomes on measures of attention, children
with comorbid disorders were excluded from the study. Exclusion criteria included the
presence of: preterm birth (<36 weeks gestation), moyamoya disease, sickle cell disease,
CNS vasculitis, Down Syndrome, and recurrent seizures. As a result, 196 children (126
male, 70 female) met inclusion criteria for the current investigation and remained in the
sample for study. See Table 1 for a description of the patient demographics.

Table 1
Patient Demographics
Demographics
All
Perinatal Early Childhood Late Childhood
Participants
Stroke
Stroke
Stroke
Number of Participants
196
58
75
63
Males/Females
126/70
36/22
46/29
44/19
a
IQ
91.58
85.93
93.38
94.33
Age at Stroke
4.66
0.0018
2.80
11.16
Age at Testing
11.51
9.71
10.18
14.74
Time since Stroke
6.85
9.71
7.38
3.58
¹ Perinatal Stroke: before 28 days of life; Early Childhood Stroke: between 29 days and 5
years of life; Late Childhood Stroke: after 5 years of life.
² Age/Time: mean number of years.
a
Mean Full Scale IQ
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Procedures
The data used in this model are archival. The primary investigator was involved
in the data collection for some of the children included in the study, while administering
neuropsychological assessments during a clinical practicum placement in the Paediatric
Stroke Clinic at the Hospital for Sick Children. The remaining data were accessed
through an archival database, collected by other clinical researchers in the same clinic.
Test Administration. During the initial neuropsychological assessment,
demographic and neurological characteristics of the children were determined based on a
review of health records (including MRI reports), questionnaires completed by parents
prior to the assessment, and structured parent interviews. The neuropsychological
assessments took place at the Hospital for Sick Children, and were administered either by
a clinical neuropsychologist, a supervised psychometrist, or a supervised student. In the
Paediatric Stroke Clinic there are different core test batteries depending on the age of the
child (4-5-year-olds; 6-16-year-olds; or 17-year-olds and up), based on the norms
available for particular age ranges. Often, tests are omitted or added to the core test
batteries, given the discretion of the clinical neuropsychologist, based on a child’s
limitations or a particular clinical referral question. All participants and/or caregivers
were provided with a full neuropsychological assessment report with recommendations.
The clinical neuropsychologist conducted feedback sessions with the participants and/or
caregivers following all assessments.
Sampling Procedures. Several children in the study were assessed through the
Paediatric Stroke Clinic on multiple occasions. In general, children tend to be assessed
every 2 to 5 years, depending on the individual clinical question (Kitchen et al., 2012).
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Whenever possible, assessments were scheduled at times of academic transition (e.g.,
beginning elementary school, beginning high school, or preparing for post-secondary
life), when children will benefit most from the identification or reassessment of
accommodations and supports.
In the current investigation, scores from the most recent assessment were selected
for participants with multiple test sessions, based on the precedent set by previous stroke
research (e.g., Kitchen et al., 2012). Selecting the test data most remote from the acute
stroke increases the probability that children have reached their potential for recovery,
and therefore relies on the most stable scores. In addition, given that children tend to
show greater cognitive deficits as they get older even if their abilities appear relatively
spared during toddler or preschool years (Westmacott et al., 2009), it is important to
assess attention later in development. Assessments of children during the acute stages of
post-stroke recovery may either reflect impairments that are likely to improve with time
or fail to identify impairments in skills that have yet to begin developing (Anderson et al.,
2011). For a graphical representation of Age at Testing across participants, see Appendix
D. A breakdown of Age at Testing across tests of interest can be found in Appendix E.
Mean time since stroke was 6.85 years and ranged from less than one month to 17.44
years. A breakdown of Time since Stroke across tests of interest can be found in
Appendix F.
Materials
The following cognitive measures of attention were included in the current
investigation: Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System (D-KEFS: Colour-Word
Interference, Trail Making Test); Test of Everyday Attention for Children (TEA-Ch; Sky
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Search (SS), Score!, and Sky Search Dual Task (SS DT); Trail Making Test (Trails A and
Trails B); Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-R, WAIS-III, WAIS-IV) and
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC-III, WISC-IV), including Digit Span,
Coding, and Letter-Number Sequencing subtests, when available; and Wisconsin Card
Sorting Test (WCST). See Appendix A for complete descriptions of the tests
investigated in the current study and rationale for their inclusion as a measure of
attention. See Appendix G for descriptive statistics of each test of attention.
CHAPTER 3
Statistical Analyses
Analysis of Missing Data
According to Narhi, Laaksonen, Hietala, Ahonen, and Lyvti (2001), there is a
significant challenge when attempting to use data collected during clinical assessment for
research purposes. Inherently, clinical testing has a different purpose than collecting data
for research. In a clinical setting, test measures were added or removed from an
assessment battery, based on the individual’s presenting concerns and needs, whereas for
research purposes (in the case of a prospective study) fixed batteries are administered.
For this reason, data collected in a clinical setting and used in a retrospective study (as is
the case in the current investigation) will likely be affected by missing data. Simply
eliminating cases with missing data will reduce the statistical power (Narhi et al., 2001;
McCleary, 2002); therefore, as long as there is a reasonable amount of data present in the
sample, methods of estimation can be used to determine relationships in the data.
Unfortunately, there are no set standards for the amount of missing data that is acceptable
in a given data set (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007).
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In the present investigation, an Analysis of Missing Data was conducted after
eliminating any individuals who were missing 100% of the data of interest. Of the
remaining 196 participants who met the inclusion criteria outlined in the participants
section above, 165 had missing data, with an average of 38% missing data overall within
the sample. Individual tests may not have been administered to any particular child in
this sample for a variety of reasons, including age cutoffs in the norms, time restrictions
during testing, or specific referral questions that dictated the test battery. Little’s Missing
Completely at Random (MCAR) test was statistically nonsignificant (Χ² [505] = 533.50,
p = .184), suggesting that the data appear to be missing at random. Note that because the
reasons for the missing data are known, data cannot be considered missing completely at
random, despite Little’s MCAR value being significant. Rather, data can be considered
statistically missing at random (MAR), suggesting that there is no predictable pattern of
missingness that might influence the outcome of the results.
Dealing with Missing Data: Maximum Likelihood Estimation
There has been a recent interest in relying on statistical software that estimates
means and variances of a dataset based on the underlying pattern of missing data. In
structural equation modeling, the most widely used statistical criterion is the maximum
likelihood (ML) algorithm (Byrne, 2010). ML is the statistical process of identifying
parameter estimates, by determining estimates that maximize the likelihood that the
sample data are from a normal population. All of the estimates are calculated
simultaneously; therefore, the estimation process is considered to be a full-information
method, and is also referred to as Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML; Kline,
2005).
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The AMOS (Analysis of Moment Structure) software relies on the ML approach
to deal with missing data in modelling. Mueller and Hancock (2010) provide a rule of
thumb for using ML, which suggests that there should be at least five cases per model
parameter for ML to be considered trustworthy. Given that the current sample had a
maximum of 39 model parameters in the confirmatory factor analyses for Goal #1, the
sample of 196 participants was considered reasonable. When conducting the full latent
variable models for Goal #2, there were 50 parameters for the sample of 196 participants,
resulting in limited power of the models.
Testing Assumptions
Normality. Analyses of skewness and kurtosis in SPSS demonstrated that WCST
Errors, Trails A, and Trails B tests had non-normal data. Outliers from WCST were
removed, which provided a normal distribution for the WCST Errors test. The ranges of
standardized scores were restricted for Trails A and B using the winsorization method,
which resulted in a normal distribution of data. Normality of the sample of children was
assessed, based on factors of Age at Stroke and Age at Testing. The distribution of Age
at Stroke is positively skewed, such that 38% of children in the sample had strokes before
the age of 1 year (see Appendix B), while the distribution of Age at Testing is normal
(see Appendix D). These factors need to be taken into consideration when making
inferences about the effects of the predictors on the outcome variables.
Multicollinearity. The correlations among all variables of interest in the model
were calculated. Although Tabachnik and Fidell (2001) consider a correlation above r =
.90 to be a sign of multicollinearity between two variables, Meyers, Gamst, and Guarino
(2006) caution against including variables with a correlation above r = .80. Because the
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WCST Numbers of Errors and Number of Perseverative Errors variables were above the
recommended cutoff (r = .859), there was concern about the possibility of
multicollinearity in the model. As a result, the WCST Perseverative Errors variable was
not included in the analysis; instead, only the WCST Number of Errors variable
(standardized score) and the Number of Categories variable (raw score) were analysed;
these variables had a more reasonable correlation (r = .766). None of the other
independent variables were correlated above the r = .80 cutoff.
Severity of Injury
In order to examine the severity of impairment across ages, a Pearson correlation
was conducted between the Full Scale IQ (FSIQ) scores and three age factors (Age at
Stroke, Age at Testing, and Time since Stroke). Of the 196 children in the sample, 41
had FSIQ scores below the average range (in the Borderline to Extremely Low ranges),
while 27 of the children had FSIQ scores above the average range (ranging from High
Average to Very Superior). Results of the Pearson correlation suggested that there was
not a significant correlation between FSIQ and Age at Stroke (r = .149, ns), nor was there
a significant correlation between FSIQ and Age at Testing (r = -.102, ns). There was,
however, a significant correlation between FSIQ and Time since Stroke (r = -.276, p
=.000).
The findings of this analysis of severity suggest that the longer the time since a
child’s stroke, at their most recent testing, the lower their FSIQ tends to be. The negative
correlation exists despite a lack of significant relationship between severity and Age at
Stroke as well as severity and Age at Testing. This finding provides support for the
theory that children tend to grow into their impairments. Despite potential gains in raw
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scores on the IQ tests as the children develop, they may demonstrate a decrease in
standardized scores over time as the gap in development of skills increases between the
child and his or her peers. In the subsequent analyses, the relationship between FSIQ and
Time since Stroke was taken into consideration.
In addition to examining the relationship with FSIQ, a Pearson correlation was
conducted between an overall Attention Composite and three age factors (i.e., Age at
Stroke, Age at Testing, and Time since Stroke). The Attention Composite was calculated
by taking the mean standardized score for each of the tests of attention. Of the 196
participants included in the sample, 16 children had an Attention Composite score in the
Mildly to Moderately impaired range (z < -1.0).
Once an overall Attention Composite was determined for each child, the scores
were correlated with the three age factors. There was no significant correlation between
the Attention Composite and Age at Stroke (r = .119, ns), nor was there a significant
correlation between the Attention Composite and Age at Testing (r = -.045, ns). There
was, however, a significant negative correlation between the Attention Composite and
Time since Stroke (r = -.194, p =.008). Once again, this finding appears to support the
theory that children tend to grow into their impairments, such that a child’s overall
attention abilities may continue to decrease the longer it has been since the child’s stroke.
CHAPTER 4
Goal #1: Confirmatory Factor Analysis
Method
The first goal of the investigation was to identify whether a three- or four-factor
model of attention best fit a sample of children with AIS. Confirmatory Factor Analysis
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(CFA) was used to test the fit of the models, using the AMOS software. The first step in
the analysis was to test the validity of the two measurement models, prior to evaluating
the structural model. CFA was used to test the validity of the factors under consideration,
determining the extent to which observed variables (i.e., performance on tests of interest)
represent the underlying factors under consideration (Byrne, 2010). Once a model was
identified, the next step in the process of assessing model fit was to examine the
significance of the parameter estimates. In order for the model to the considered properly
specified, the nonsignificant paths of the parameters were removed prior to determining
fit (based on Byrne, 2010).
Byrne outlined the most important goodness-of-fit statistics as: CMIN/DF (< 3.0
= good fit); NFI (between 0-1 is good fit); CFI (> .95 is good fit, .80-.95 is reasonable
fit); RMSEA (< .05 is good fit, .05-.10 is reasonable fit, > .10 is bad fit); and PCLOSE (>
.05 is good fit). Ideally, the probability of the model will be nonsignificant (p > .05);
however, this is a rare occurrence with a relatively large sample size (Byrne, 2010).
In order to replicate the three- and four-factor models of attention, a combination
of tests used in the development of the original models were considered. In order to
represent Mirsky’s model of attention, the tests used in Mirsky’s (1991) original factor
analysis were included (see Appendix H for a list of Mirsky’s original factors). For the
tests that were not available in the present sample, assessment measures deemed to be
theoretically equivalent (based on the test descriptions outlined in Appendix A) were
selected for analysis. See the Introduction subheading entitled Mirsky’s Four-Factor
Model of Attention (p. 9) for a discussion of the original tests used, as well as
theoretically equivalent tests that have been more recently developed. A set of tests were
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also selected to represent aspects of attention outlined in Posner’s model (based on
descriptions by Posner & Rothbart, 2007, and Manly et al., 2001). See the Introduction
subheading entitled Posner’s Three-Factor Model of Attention (p. 6) for a discussion of
the tests purported to measure aspects of Posner’s attention.
In the current study, all tests of interest were combined in the factor analyses.
The final tests of attention included in the present study were: Trail Making Test A
(Trails A) and Trail Making Test B (Trails B), Stroop Inhibition test (Stroop), Wisconsin
Card Sorting Test Number of Errors variable (WCST Errors) and Number of Categories
variable (WCST Categories), Coding, Digit Span, Letter-Number Sequencing, Test of
Everyday Attention for Children (TEA-Ch) Sky Search Attention (SS), Sky Search Dual
Task (SS DT), and Score! subtests.
Results
Three-factor model of attention. In an attempt to best replicate the three-factor
model of attention described by Posner, three iterations of the model were analyzed,
ultimately maximizing the fit. When the originally selected tests of attention were first
analyzed (see Table 2), the model was not identified, due to a Heywood Case (i.e.,
negative error variance), for the WCST Errors variable. Respecification of the model
was therefore required. Error variance for the WCST Errors variable was constrained,
based on the reliability estimate of WCST Errors. Given the reliability coefficient of
WCST Errors (α = .71; Heaton, Chelune, Talley, Kay and Curtiss, 1993), the residual
variance is 29%. The residual variance was multiplied by the variance of the WCST
Errors variable in the model (49.62), to determine the error variance (14.39). The error
variance was then assigned to the WCST Errors variable.
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Table 2
Factor Matrix for the Original Three-Factor Model of Attention (Posner)
Orient
TEA-Ch SS
Trails A
Trails B
Coding

Alert
TEA-Ch Score!
TEA-Ch SS DT
Digit Span
Letter-Number
Sequencing

Executive
Stroop
WCST Errors
WCST Categories

The respecified model was subsequently analyzed, and was considered to be
properly identified. With respect to model fit, however, none of the Executive Attention
factor parameters had significant estimates, suggesting that some (or all) of the variables
did not load well on the Executive Attention factor. In an attempt to better fit the threefactor model, the Stroop test was moved to the Orient factor of attention (based on
evidence from Manly et al., 2001), instead of the Executive Attention factor as proposed
by Posner. The resulting three-factor matrix, updated based on Manly’s (2001)
description of a three-factor model of attention, can be found in Table 3.

Table 3
Factor Matrix for the Final Three-Factor Model of Attention (Manly)
Focus_Select
TEA-Ch SS
Trails A
Trails B
Coding
Stroop

Sustain_Vigilance
TEA-Ch Score!
TEA-Ch SS DT
Digit Span
Letter-Number Sequencing

Switching_Control
WCST Errors
WCST Categories
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The respecified model – based on Manly’s descriptions of the three factors – was
subsequently analyzed and the model was identified. All of the parameter estimates were
feasible and statistically significant in the third iteration of the model (see Table 4 for a
description of parameter estimates from the three-factor model). The goodness-of-fit
statistics suggest that the model has a relatively good fit overall; some of the statistics
represent a reasonable fit (p = .016; CFI = .943; RMSEA = .052), while others represent a
good fit (CMIN/DF = 1.526; NFI = .859; PCLOSE = .425). There is no evidence of
model misfit (see Figure 1 for a representation of the three-factor model of attention).
Four-factor model of attention. A four-factor model of attention was
determined based on Mirsky’s (1991) factor analysis (see Table 5 for the four-factor
matrix). The error variance for the WCST Errors variable was constrained to 14.39 in
this model, consistent with the previous three-factor model. A single iteration of the
model was needed in order to be specified. The four-factor model was analyzed using
CFA and the model was identified. All of the parameter estimates were feasible and
statistically significant (see Table 6 for a description of parameter estimates for the fourfactor model). The goodness-of-fit statistics suggest that the model has a relatively good
fit overall; some of the statistics represent a reasonable fit (p = .019; CFI = .948; RMSEA
= .052), while others represent a good fit (CMIN/DF = 1.521; NFI = .870; PCLOSE =
.431). There is no evidence of model misfit (see Figure 2 for a representation of the fourfactor model).
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Table 4
Parameter Estimates for the Three-Factor Model of Attention
Unstandardized
Estimates

Parameters

Standard
Error

Standardized
Estimates

--0.287
0.223
0.099
0.083
--0.563
0.579
0.537
--0.695

0.621
0.712
0.732
0.668
0.658
0.405
0.513
0.858
0.763
0.832
0.950

Factor Loadings
TEA-Ch SS
Stroop
Coding
Trails B
Trails_A
TEA-Ch Score!
TEA-Ch SS DT
Digit Span
Letter-Number
WCST Categories
WCST Errors

←
←
←
←
←
←
←
←
←
←
←

Focus_Select
Focus_Select
Focus_Select
Focus_Select
Focus_Select
Sustain_Vigilance
Sustain_Vigilance
Sustain_Vigilance
Sustain_Vigilance
Switching_Control
Switching_Control

1.000ᵃ
1.182***
1.1***
0.475***
0.406***
1.000ᵃ
1.539**
1.97***
1.759**
1.000ᵃ
8.864***

Variances and Covariances
Focus_Select
Sustain_Vigilance
Switching_Control

4.917**
2.000
1.711***

1.739
1.167
0.334

Errors
err10
14.390ᵃ
err5
7.85***
err4
6.669***
err3
5.16***
err2
1.377***
err1
1.063***
err9
10.173***
err8
13.263***
err7
2.773**
err6
4.431***
err11
0.758***
* p ≤ .05. ** p ≤ .01. *** p = .00. ᵃ not tested for significance.

--1.343
1.502
0.947
0.232
0.171
1.519
2.355
0.846
0.824
0.129
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Figure 1. Three-factor model based on Manly’s model of attention.
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Table 5
Tests of Attention Used for the Four-Factor Model (Mirsky)
Focus/Execute
Coding
Stroop
Trails A
Trails B
TEA-Ch SS

Sustain
TEA-Ch Score!
TEA-Ch SS DT

Shift
WCST Errors
WCST Categories

Encode
Digit Span
Letter-Number
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Table 6
Parameter Estimates for the Four-Factor Model of Attention
Unstandardized
Estimates

Parameters

Standard
Error

Standardized
Estimates

--0.174
0.200
0.087
0.077
--0.563
--0.698
0.256
---

0.721
0.734
0.623
0.654
0.657
0.509
0.679
0.830
0.950
0.777
0.753

Factor Loadings
Stroop
Coding
TEA-Ch SS
Trails B
Trails A
TEA-Ch Score!
TEA-Ch SS DT
WCST Categories
WCST Errors
Arithmetic
Digit Span

←
←
←
←
←
←
←
←
←
←
←

1.000ᵃ
0.92***
0.835***
0.388***
0.338***
1.000ᵃ
1.602**
1.000ᵃ
8.881***
1.289***
1.000ᵃ

Focus_Execute
Focus_Execute
Focus_Execute
Focus_Execute
Focus_Execute
Sustain
Sustain
Shift
Shift
Encode
Encode

Variances and Covariances
Focus_Execute
Sustain
Shift
Encode

7.057**
3.108**
1.679***
6.015***

2.537
1.601
0.325
1.492

err8
14.390ᵃ
err5
6.527***
err4
5.126***
err3
7.776***
err2
1.416***
err1
1.063***
err7
8.898***
err6
9.298**
err9
0.761***
err11
6.562**
err10
4.586***
* p ≤ .05. ** p ≤ .01. *** p = .00. ᵃ not tested for significance.

--1.503
0.939
1.333
0.234
0.172
1.637
3.032
0.130
2.163
1.170

Errors
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Figure 2. Four-factor model of attention based on Mirsky’s model.
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Discussion
Two prominent theories of attention were compared using a sample of children
with AIS. A three-factor model and a four-factor model were analyzed using
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and the parameter estimates and fit statistics were
compared. The three-factor model representing Posner’s theory of attention did not fit
with the given data. However, a similar three-factor model proposed by Manly et al.
(2001) did fit the data reasonably well. The four-factor model of attention described by
Mirsky also had a reasonable fit with all of the tests of interest. Although the three- and
four-factor models of attention had equivalent fit indices, the four-factor model was more
consistent with the theoretical constructs, neuroanatomical substrates, and developmental
processes related to the attentional factors under consideration, as discussed below.
Posner’s three-factor model did not represent a good fit with the data. The
primary difficulty with Posner’s model was that none of the tests included in the
Executive Attention factor had significant parameter estimates with the factor of attention
they were considered to be representing. Posner and his colleagues (2007) have
suggested that Executive Attention is represented by attention measures such as the
Stroop Inhibition test. Kavros et al. (2008) stated that the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test
(WCST) would fall under the same factor of Executive Attention. However, in the
current investigation, the Stroop test and the WCST subtests were not significantly
correlated with one another; small, nonsignificant correlations were identified between
Stroop and both WCST Errors (r = .215, ns) and WCST Categories (r = .186, ns). These
findings suggested that Stroop test and the WCST subtests do not load onto the same
factor, and therefore do not both represent Posner’s factor of Executive Attention.
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When Manly and colleagues (2001) were establishing their Test of Everyday
Attention for Children (TEA-Ch), they examined some of the most traditional
neuropsychological tests used to measure attention and determined their relationship both
to one another and to the newly developed subtests of the TEA-Ch. Although their
terminology varied, Manly and colleagues identified a three-factor model of attention that
maps onto Posner’s original three-factor model. Manly referred to the three factors as: 1)
Focus/Selective Attention; 2) Sustained Attention/Vigilance; and 3) Attentional
Control/Switching. Manly and colleagues found that although the WCST subtests loaded
on the Attentional Control/Switching factor of attention (similar to Posner’s Executive
Attention), the Stroop test had a higher correlation with tests of Focus/Selective Attention
(similar to Posner’s Orient), such as the Trail Making Test (see Table 4 for the factors of
attention represented by Manly’s three-factor model). In the current investigation, when
the Stroop test was moved to the factor equivalent to Manly’s Focus/Selective Attention
and Posner’s Orient, the model represented a good fit for the data. In fact, the fit
statistics were comparable (showing nearly identical values) to those found when
replicating Mirsky’s four-factor model.
Given that the two models (i.e., Manly’s three-factor and Mirsky’s four-factor
models) fit the data equally well, the question becomes: why separate out the factors of
attention to create a four-factor model if a more parsimonious, three-factor model is
available? In other words, do the four factors represent a more accurate description of
different theoretical functions, or an unnecessary elaboration of the three-factor model?
These questions can be addressed by interpreting the current findings in light of
psychometric, neuroanatomical, and developmental perspectives.
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One possibility for the equivalence among models in terms of fit indices is that
the three-factor model is simply a condensed version of the four-factor model, such that
Manly’s Alerting/Sustained attention factor represents a combination of Mirsky’s Sustain
and Encode factors. In order to make this judgment, the theoretical constructs of the
psychometric tests considered to be responsible for the factors of attention were
considered. One of the primary theoretical differences between Sustain and Encode, as
defined by Mirsky, is that Sustain is a process of vigilance (i.e., sustaining attention over
time), while Encode is considered to be equivalent to working memory, which involves
holding the information in mind in order to work with it in some way. Vigilance and
working memory are arguably very different cognitive processes that should be measured
by tests specific to their underlying attentional constructs. This conclusion is consistent
with the four-factor model, which suggests that Sustain and Encode are individual
factors, representing unique aspects of attention.
The neuroanatomical correlates of the attentional network can also be taken into
account in order to guide the selection of the three- vs. the four-factor model of attention.
Posner and his colleagues have reported that Alerting attention is regulated by the
prefrontal and lateral parietal cortical regions, as well as subcortical structures, such as
the locus coeruleus (a nucleus in the pons of the brainstem) and the thalamus (a structure
at the base of the cerebral hemispheres that projects to the cortex). Similarly, Manly and
colleagues suggested that the prefrontal regions are primarily responsible for regulation
of sustaining attention or maintaining vigilance. Mirsky’s Sustained attention was
originally reported to be regulated by structures of the brainstem, such as the tectum and
mesopontine regions of the reticular formation, as well as the thalamic nuclei. However,
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Koziol et al. (2014) have since outlined the literature suggesting that the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex, the ventral medial frontal cortex, and several subcortical structures (i.e.,
basal ganglia, striatum, globus pallidus, and thalamus) have all been associated with
sustained attention.
The findings from the studies, demonstrating neuroanatomical correlates of
attentional processes, suggest some overlap in the structures responsible for the vigilance
aspect of attention found in both the three-factor models (e.g., Posner’s Alert, Manly’s
Sustained Attention), and the four-factor models (e.g., Mirsky’s Sustain). In fact, Mirsky
et al. (1991) concluded that the Sustain factor of attention is similar to Posner’s Alerting
attention (or what Manly referred to as Sustained Attention/Vigilance), because the
sustained attention processes rely on areas of the brainstem and the medial thalamic
region.
Koziol et al. (2014) suggested that the neuroanatomical substrates of Encode
make up a network that includes neuroanatomical structures connected through the
Fronto-Parietal Network (FPN; including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, inferior
parietal lobe, anterior cingulate cortex, cerebellum, and the medial occipital cortex). As
the demands of the attentional task change – Koziol and colleagues (2014) report – the
brain regions within the FPN appear to rapidly update their functional patterns of
connectivity.
There appears to be some overlap between the structures involved in both
Encoding and Sustained Attention (e.g., both have some involvement of the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex), a finding consistent with the theory that attention is a network of
interrelated structures and cognitive processes. Evidence for the distinction between
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factors of Encoding and Sustained Attention comes from the fact that there are exclusive
neuroanatomical structures that only appear to be responsible for the activation of certain
attentional processes and not others. For example, the subcortical structures (e.g., basal
ganglia, thalamus, etc.) appear to play a role in Sustained Attention, but not in the
Encoding attention, which involves a network of largely cortical structures. This
dissociation suggests that the two constructs are separable based on a functional
neuroanatomical perspective.
When examining individual factors of attention in children it is also important to
consider the developmental context. Given that aspects of Encode (or working memory)
and Sustained Attention (or vigilance) are mediated by different neuroanatomical regions,
these neurological structures are also expected to be established at varying stages
throughout a child’s development. Processes that are moderated by a network that
includes subcortical cerebral structures (i.e., Sustained Attention or vigilance) are
reportedly the earliest to develop in a child’s life (Richards, 2004). In contrast, processes
mediated primarily by the cortical structures (i.e., Encode or working memory) develop
later in life and are not entirely established early in childhood (Rueda et al., 2004). The
development of Encode is therefore distinct from the development of Sustained
Attention, which is controlled by earlier developing cerebral structures. The evidence
demonstrating that factors of Sustain and Encode are established at different stages in
development suggests that the four-factor model of attention (which delineates these two
factors) is a better representation of the attentional network than a three-factor model.
Thus, when examining 1) the theoretical constructs of the tests traditionally used
to evaluate attentional processes; 2) the neuroanatomical correlates responsible for the
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development and activation of the factors of attention; and 3) the development of
individual factors of attention over time, a strong case can be made for the argument that
Mirsky’s Encode and Mirsky’s Sustain/Manly’s Vigilance represent two unique factors
of attention, rather than representing a variety of tests of attention that are grouped
together within Posner’s Sustain factor. Therefore, the four-factor model can be
considered the best representation of the attentional network.
Challenges and Further Considerations. Despite the evidence suggesting that
the four-factor model best represents attention in this sample, there were a number of
challenges encountered throughout this investigation that may have influenced the
findings. First, there is considerable conceptual overlap in the literature about what
constitutes attention, working memory, and executive functioning (Klenberg, Korkman,
and Lahti-Nuuttila, 2001). Certain neuropsychological tests are considered to be
measures of attention by some and executive functioning (or even aspects of memory) by
others. In the current sample, the WCST scores did not load well with other factors in the
models of interest. An argument can be made that the WCST is not truly a test of
attention and therefore does not load well with the other measures of attention. Through
the process of model specification, it was determined that the models with the fit best
(i.e., those with equivalent fit to one another) were those in which WCST subscales
represented an exclusive factor (i.e., Mirsky’s Shift or Manly’s Attentional
Control/Switching). The finding that the WCST did not load well with the Stroop
subtests may suggest that Stroop and WCST are tapping into different cognitive
processes altogether, such as attention and executive functioning for example, and
therefore should not both be considered measures of attention.
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Executive attention is considered to be a measure of response inhibition,
attentional control, switching, shifting, and conflict resolution (Posner, 2007; Manly,
2001; Anderson et al., 2001). The WCST is, by definition, a measure of executive
function, requiring strategic planning, searching, relying on feedback to shift cognitive
set, and inhibiting impulsive behaviour (Strauss, Sherman, & Spreen, 2006). Although
there is a significant overlap between executive aspects of attention and the definition of
executive functioning, there appears to be an added problem-solving or metacognitive
component to the WCST that exceeds the definitions of attentional functioning.
As Anderson et al. (2001) described, executive functions make up several factors,
including attention control (i.e., selective and sustained attention), cognitive flexibility
(i.e., working memory, shifting attention, and self-monitoring), and goal setting (i.e.,
initiating, planning, problem-solving). Therefore, executive functions encompass some
(but not all) factors of attention. For instance, Klenberg et al. (2001) found that although
inhibition, attention, and executive functions are highly interrelated cognitive processes,
their developmental trajectories are separate from one another, identifying them as unique
aspects of cognition. As the investigators noted, there is a lack of conceptual clarity
throughout the research on the development of attentional and executive functions. There
appears to be significant overlap across the concepts, which makes it difficult to
distinguish between them in order to operationalize and measure attentional or executive
functions.
Given Anderson’s (2001) argument that the WCST is not a measure of attention
after all, but more of a pure executive functioning task, one could argue that Posner’s
three-factor model of attention would be theoretically sound, as long as the WCST
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subtests did not represent aspects of Executive Attention. In fact, in the current
investigation, when the Stroop Inhibition and Switching subtests from the D-KEFS were
substituted for the WCST Errors and Number of Categories in Posner’s model, the fit
estimates were reasonable, suggesting that Posner’s three-factor model represents the
data of interest, as long as WCST is not included in the model.
Difficulties with testing the models in the current investigation arose as several
issues with the data from the WCST subtests were encountered, which resulted in
problems initially identifying the models. One issue was multicollinearity among the
subscales of the WCST (i.e., between the Number of Errors and Number of Perseverative
Errors variables), which was eliminated by removing the Number of Perseverative Errors
variable and replacing it with the Number of Categories achieved, a variable that taps into
different aspects of the WCST. Another issue that arose in the analysis was the negative
error variance of the WCST Errors variable, which was subsequently constrained in order
to identify the model.
One possible explanation for the challenges with the negative error variance is
that the range of responses in the WCST was not as wide as that of other tests, and there
was a much higher variance in the WCST scores. It is possible that the subtests of the
WCST do not fit with the sample because the data specific to the WCST are not missing
at random. In fact, the WCST is rarely given to young children, likely due to the fact that
executive aspects of attention are not expected to be developed before the age of 10 years
(Rueda et al., 2004). When looking at the sample of 196 participants, the age at testing
ranges from 3.42 through 23. 26 years of age for the entire sample (i.e., a 19 year range),
with a mean of 11.50 years, a median of 10.94 years, and a mode of 7.32 years (see
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Appendix E). When examining the WCST data in isolation, however, the age at testing
ranges from 6.88 through 23.26 years (i.e., a 16 year range), with a mean of 13.05 years,
a median of 13.13 years, and a mode of 17 years, which is much higher than the mode of
the entire sample. Unfortunately, the restricted age range within this set of data is a
factor of using archival data.
Despite the challenges presented within the data, the analyses demonstrated that
both a three- and four-factor model of attention were identified, and therefore both
effectively represented the data from the group of children with AIS. In reference to the
competing theories of attention, Mirsky et al. (1991) suggested that:
The nature of the neuropsychological model of attention that is created depends
upon the behavioural data that are used to generate it. Since all these conceptions
deal with fundamentally the same database, there is a fair degree of communality
among them; the differences seem to be a function of which part of the database
the authors have chosen to emphasize (p. 140).
Given that the emphasis, in the present investigation, was on the theoretical
constructs measured by various neuropsychological tests, the unique neuroanatomical
correlates associated with each attentional process, and an understanding of the
development of attentional networks throughout childhood, the four-factor model was
determined to be the best fit for the data. As such, the data suggest that performance on
the four factors of attention can be used to examine predictors of outcome in a clinical
sample of children with AIS.
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CHAPTER 5
Goal #2: Full Latent Variable Model
Method
The second goal of the investigation was to determine whether Age at Stroke or
Age at Testing are predictors of outcome on factors of attention, and whether the
predictors modify the relationship with one another within the model. Given that the
four-factor model of attention was determined to be the best fit for the data in Goal #1,
the second goal was to determine the full latent variable model, including both the
measurement model (i.e., the previously determined factor analytic model) and the
structural model (i.e., the predictor variables included for regression). This process first
involved examining Age at Stroke as a predictor for each factor of attention. Secondly,
Age at Stroke was considered a predictor of each factor of attention while controlling for
Age at Testing.
Although the control variable of interest is Age at Testing (given that aspects of
attention are established at different ages) there was concern that examining both Age at
Stroke and Age at Testing within the model may result in significant multicollinearity
among the variables, as they both represent an individual’s age. Time since Stroke (a
variable representing number of years, but not age) was thus included in the model to
control for Age at Testing. Age at Testing was also examined as a predictor of outcome
on each factor of attention. In the final step Age at Testing was considered as a predictor
of outcome while controlling for Age at Stroke, by including Time since Stroke as the
control variable.
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In summary, four versions of the full latent variable model were considered in
Goal #2: 1) Age at Stroke as a predictor of attention; 2) Age at Stroke as a predictor of
attention while controlling for Age at Testing; 3) Age at Testing as a predictor of
attention; and 4) Age at Testing as a predictor of attention while controlling for Age at
Stroke.
Results
When Age at Stroke was included as a predictor variable, the model was
identified (Figure 3). The parameter estimates between Age at Stroke and the attention
factors are found in Table 7. There was a significant positive relationship between Age at
Stroke and Shift. In addition, there was a significant positive relationship between Age at
Stroke and Encode. Neither Focus/Execute nor Sustain were significantly predicted by
Age at Stroke.

Table 7
Parameter Estimates of Age at Stroke from the Structural Equation Model for the FourFactor Model of Attention with Age at Stroke as a Predictor
Parameters

Unstandardized Standard
Estimates
Error
Factor Loadings

Focus_Execute
← Age at Stroke
0.002
Sustain
← Age at Stroke
0.077
Shift
← Age at Stroke
0.509*
Encode
← Age at Stroke
0.089*
* p ≤ .05. ** p ≤ .01. *** p = .00. ᵃ not tested for significance.

0.047
0.060
0.200
0.046

Standardized
Estimates
0.005
0.239
0.229
0.166
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Figure 3. Structural equation model of four-factor model of attention with Age at Stroke
as predictor variable.
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To control for the effects of the child’s Age at Testing, the model was analyzed
with both Age at Stroke and Time since Stroke as predictor variables (see Figure 4).
When the two predictor variables were included, the model was identified; however,
there were 50 parameter estimates in the model, suggesting that the total power would be
limited if one attempted to interpret model fit statistics. The parameter estimates between
Age at Stroke and the four factors of attention, when Age at Testing was controlled for,
can be found in Table 8. There was a slight increase in the parameter estimate between
Age at Stroke and Shift, with the relationship remaining significant. The relationship
between Age at Stroke and Focus/Execute became significantly more pronounced; when
controlling for Age at Testing, there is a significant negative relationship between Age at
Stroke and Focus/Execute. The relationship between Age at Stroke and Encode
decreased, and is no longer significant when controlling for Age at Testing. The
relationship between Age at Stroke and Sustain remained nonsignificant, even after
controlling for Age at Testing.

Table 8
Parameter Estimates of Age at Stroke from the Structural Equation Model for the FourFactor Model of Attention with Age at Stroke as a Predictor while Controlling for Age at
Testing
Parameters

Unstandardized Standard Standardized
Estimates
Error
Estimates
Factor Loadings

Focus_Execute
← Age at Stroke
-0.131 *
Sustain
← Age at Stroke
0.034
Shift
← Age at Stroke
0.094 **
Encode
← Age at Stroke
0.008
* p ≤ .05. ** p ≤ .01. *** p = .00. ᵃ not tested for significance.

0.064
0.082
0.035
0.059

-0.248
0.107
0.357
0.017
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Figure 4. Structural equation model of four-factor model of attention with Age at Stroke
and Time since Stroke as predictor variables.
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When the model was analyzed with Age at Testing as a single predictor variable,
the model was identified (see Figure 5). The parameter estimates for the relationships
between Age at Testing and the four factors of interest can be found in Table 9. There
was a significant positive relationship between Age at Testing and Shift. There was a
significant negative relationship between Focus/Execute and Age at Testing. Neither
Encode nor Sustain was significantly predicted by Age at Testing as the sole predictor
variable.

Table 9
Parameter Estimates of Age at Testing from the Structural Equation Model for the FourFactor Model of Attention with Age at Testing as a Predictor
Parameters

Focus_Execute
Sustain
Shift
Encode
* p ≤ .05. ** p ≤ .01.

Unstandardized Standard Standardized
Estimates
Error
Estimates
Factor Loadings

← Age at Testing
-0.147 *
← Age at Testing
-0.008
← Age at Testing
0.091 **
← Age at Testing
-0.007
*** p = .00. ᵃ not tested for significance.

0.066
0.085
0.035
0.061

-0.222
-0.018
0.274
-0.010

To control for the effects of the child’s Age at Stroke, the model was analyzed
with both Age at Testing and Time since Stroke as predictor variables (see Figure 6).
When the two predictor variables were included, the model was identified; however,
there were 50 parameter estimates in the model, suggesting that the total power would be
limited if one attempted to interpret model fit statistics. The parameter estimates between
Age at Testing and the four factors of attention, when Age at Stroke was controlled for,
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Figure 5. Structural equation model of four-factor model of attention with Age at Testing
as predictor variable.
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Figure 6. Structural equation model of four-factor model of attention with Age at Testing
and Time since Stroke as predictor variables.
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can be found in Table 10. The parameter estimate between Age at Testing and Shift
remained significant; there was no change in the estimate values or the level of
significance when Age at Stroke was controlled for. The negative relationship between
Focus/Execute and Age at Testing also remained significant; there was no change in the
estimate values or the level of significance when Age at Stroke was controlled for.
Although the estimates for Sustain and Encode increased slightly when Age at Stroke
was controlled for, neither factor was significantly predicted by Age at Testing.

Table 10
Parameter Estimates of Age at Testing from the Structural Equation Model for the FourFactor Model of Attention with Age at Testing as a Predictor while Controlling for Age
at Stroke
Parameters

Focus_Execute
Sustain
Shift
Encode
* p ≤ .05. ** p ≤ .01.

Unstandardized Standard Standardized
Estimates
Error
Estimates
Factor Loadings

← Age at Testing
-0.131 *
← Age at Testing
0.034
← Age at Testing
0.094 **
← Age at Testing
0.008
*** p = .00. ᵃ not tested for significance.

0.064
0.082
0.035
0.059

-0.202
0.08
0.283
0.013

Post-Hoc Analyses
In an attempt to begin to tease apart the relationship between different lesion
characteristics and the timing of strokes, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) was
conducted to compare Age at Stroke to particular lesion characteristics of interest in the
stroke literature: severity of injury (single vs. multiple infarcts); laterality (left- vs. right-
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sided lesions); and lesion location (cortical, subcortical, and combined
cortical/subcortical strokes).
There was no main effect of injury severity, F(2,180) = 2.94, ns; Age at Stroke
did not differ significantly for children with single vs. multiple infarcts. There was no
main effect of laterality, F(2,180) = .917, ns; Age at Stroke did not differ significantly for
children with strokes localized to the left vs. right cerebral hemisphere. There was,
however, a significant main effect of lesion location, F(2,180) = 6.35, p = .002. A Tukey
post hoc test revealed that Age at Stroke was statistically significantly older for children
with strokes localized to the subcortical regions (M = 6.55, SD = 5.23) compared to those
with strokes localized to the cortical regions (2.11 ± 4.45 years, p = .000) and those with
combined cortical and subcortical strokes (4.26 ± 2.29 years, p = .018). There was no
statistically significant difference between children with cortical strokes (M = 2.11, SD =
4.07) and those with a combination of cortical and subcortical strokes (M = 4.26, SD =
5.13), in terms of Age at Stroke (2.11 ± 2.15 years, ns).
Discussion
In the present investigation, Age at Stroke and Age at Testing were examined as
predictors of outcome on the four-factor model of attention. At one end of the spectrum
of cerebral recovery, the vulnerability theory suggests that the young brain is more
susceptible to impairment following cerebral insult than an older, more developed brain
(Hebb, 1947). As a result, proponents of the vulnerability theory argue that younger Age
at Stroke would be associated with greater impairment across factors of attention than
later Age at Stroke. As an extension of the vulnerability model, researchers have also
suggested that children with early acquired brain injuries tend to grow into their
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impairments, due to the “snowball” effects of early compromise (McLinden et al., 2007).
Following this line of reasoning, children with later Age at Testing would be expected to
have the greatest impairment in cognitive abilities. An interaction effect might also be
expected between the two age variables, such that children with earlier Age at Stroke
who have later Age at Testing would be expected to have the most pronounced deficits in
cognitive abilities.
At the other end of the recovery spectrum, proponents of the plasticity theory
(based on Kennard’s early findings) argue that the young brain is more amenable to
reorganization following cerebral insult than the older brain, given that skills are more
likely to be fully established and no longer as plastic in an older child or adult. Based
upon the theory of plasticity, children with later Age at Stroke would be expected to have
worse outcomes than children with earlier strokes. In order to describe the relationship
between Age at Stroke and Age at Testing with the factors of interest in the present
investigation, each factor of attention will be considered individually in the following
section.
Focus/Execute. Age at Stroke did not significantly predict outcome on
Focus/Execute when included in the model as the sole predictor variable (Figure 3);
however, when Age at Testing was controlled for (Figure 4), there was a significant
negative relationship between Age at Stroke and Focus/Execute. This finding suggests
that Age at Testing is modifying the relationship between a child’s Age at Stroke and his
or her performance on Focus/Execute. Similarly, Age at Testing had a significant
negative relationship with Focus/Execute, whether or not Age at Stroke was controlled
for in the model (Figures 5 and 6).
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The results demonstrate that younger Age at Stroke is associated with better
outcomes on measures of Focus/Execute, regardless of the age of a child at the time of
testing. In addition, older Age at Testing is associated with worse outcomes on measures
of Focus/Execute. The findings of the present investigation are not consistent with the
vulnerability theory, given that Focus/Execute is less vulnerable to insult during the
earlier years of life, when the skill is not established or is only in the beginning stages of
development. Focus/Execute appears to be more vulnerable to insult later in life, when
damage inflicted upon a more mature brain affects the already established skill, or when
the stroke occurs during a critical period of development for that skill. The findings may
be more consistent with a plasticity theory, such that insult earlier in life does not tend to
have a negative impact on the Focus/Execute skills to the same extent as later insult. The
Focus/Execute aspect of attention appears to be relatively plastic, and demonstrates
resilience following early stroke.
Focus/Execute is argued to fall under the umbrella of speed of processing, which
is considered by some to be an executive aspect of attention (Shanahan et al., 2006).
Processing speed appears to have a significant influence on an individual’s ability to
attend to stimuli, and is thought to be mediated by subcortical structures and anterior
brain regions (Anderson et al., 2006). Processing speed tends to develop gradually
throughout childhood (Anderson et al., 2001; McKay et al., 1994; Rueda et al., 2004),
with a sudden increase in proficiency of both processing speed and attention control (as
measured through digit span tasks for example) around age 15 years (Anderson et al.,
2001).
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The findings in the present investigation are consistent with the theory that the
skills required for Focus/Execute tasks develop later in childhood, and are therefore more
vulnerable to impairment later in childhood or adolescence. As the demands for a
particular skill increase over time, it becomes more difficult for a child to compensate for
an area of weakness, especially as his or her peers are continuing to make gains and
beginning to show skills equivalent to adult levels of proficiency. Perhaps these skills are
still plastic earlier in childhood, and impairment prior to the establishment of the skill is
not as detrimental as with damage due to later insult that occurs either during the ongoing
process of developing or after the establishment of the skill. In addition to vulnerability
to later insult, the findings suggest that the later in childhood or adolescence an individual
is assessed, the more likely his or her impairments are to be noticeable, as the gap
between typically-developing children and those with strokes continues to widen.
Sustain. The Sustain factor of attention was not significantly predicted by Age at
Stroke, whether or not Age at Testing was controlled for in the model (Figures 3 and 4).
Similarly, performances on measures of the Sustain factor were not significantly
predicted by Age at Testing, whether or not Age at Stroke was controlled for in the model
(Figures 5 and 6). Taken together, these findings demonstrate that performance on tests
of Sustain is not significantly impacted by a child’s age at the time of stroke or the time
of testing. The finding that Age at Stroke does not predict outcomes on Sustain suggests
that impact of an injury to the Sustain factor of attention will be similar, regardless of the
age of the child. Sustain does not appear to be particularly vulnerable to early insult, nor
is there a greater likelihood of impairment following injury after the establishment of the
skill, later in childhood. The theory of plasticity may explain these results, such that
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Sustain is not vulnerable to insult, and the brain is able to reorganize in order to spare
functioning in this attentional process.
Research has consistently demonstrated that sustained attention, or vigilance, is
the earliest developing factor of attention (Rueda et al., 2004). Demands on the Sustain
aspects of attention may not increase over time, as would be seen in the more executive
aspects of attention. The skill level that a child has achieved early in childhood may not
change over time; as a result, Age at Testing would not be related to (i.e., significantly
predict) outcome on Sustain.
Shift. When examining the Shift factor of attention, Age at Stroke is a significant
predictor of outcome, whether or not Age at Testing is controlled for in the model
(Figures 3 and 4). The significant positive relationship found between Shift and Age at
Stroke suggests that the older the child is at the time of his or her stroke, the better the
child’s performance will be on measures of Shift, regardless of his or her age at the time
of testing. The findings suggest that the Shift factor may therefore be more vulnerable to
early insult than later injury.
Age at Testing is also a significant predictor of Shift, whether or not Age at
Stroke is controlled for in the model. This finding suggests that regardless of when a
child’s stroke occurs, they will tend to have better performance on measures of Shift the
later they are tested in childhood or adolescence. The Shift factor of attention tends to be
present early in infancy (around 6 to 9 months of age) but the ability to disengage from a
particular stimulus slowly improves over time, tending not to be fully established until
later in adolescence (Rueda et al., 2004), and therefore children’s performance will
improve on the tests of shifting attention as they get older and the skills become more
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solidified. Taken together, the findings would suggest that the poorest outcomes on
measures of Shift are likely to occur for a child who has an earlier stroke and is tested
early on in childhood, before Shift is expected to be fully developed.
In their review of the “Mirsky Model”, Koziol et al. (2014) stated that Mirsky’s
Shift falls under the greater umbrella term of executive attention. As mentioned
previously, cognitive developmental literature suggests that the more executive aspects of
cognitive functioning (including executive attention) are established later in childhood.
Specifically, conflict resolution and inhibition are later developing cognitive skills and
are critical for performance on the WCST subtests, which make up Mirsky’s Shift. In
regards to Shift, the results of the current investigation support the theory of
vulnerability, suggesting that early stroke will lead to greater impairment in a child’s
performance on measures of shifting attention. However, the findings contradict the idea
that children tend to grow into their cognitive impairments. In fact, children in the present
investigation demonstrated improvement in performance over time on the Shift measures,
as executive factors of attention are expected to develop and better compensate.
Encode. When examining Encode, there is a significant relationship between
Encode and Age at Stroke as the sole predictor of outcome (Figure 3). When Age at
Testing is controlled for, however, this relationship no longer exists (Figure 4). This
finding suggests that Age at Testing is somehow modifying the relationship between Age
at Stroke and Encode. On the other hand, when Age at Testing is examined as a predictor
variable, performance on Encode is not predicted by Age at Testing, whether or not Age
at Stroke is controlled for (Figures 5 and 6). Taken together, these findings suggest that
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performance on factors of Encode may not be affected by stroke to the same extent that
other factors of attention appear to be.
Research suggests that Encode is an attentional process mediated by cortical
structures (Mirksy et al., 1991; Koziol et al., 2014), which tend to develop slowly
throughout a child’s life, and are not fully established in until later in adolescence
(Anderson et al., 2001). Encode (a working memory process) does not appear to be
influenced by the timing of a stroke in a consistent manner, such that early insult would
impair the later development of a process (consistent with the early vulnerability theory),
or that later injury would be associated with greater impairment of an established skill
(consistent with the early plasticity theory). It is possible that, because Encode is a skill
that slowly develops throughout childhood, there may not be a clear relationship between
the timing of the injury or the timing of testing and outcome on measures of Encode.
Levels of impairment, or resilience, may be relatively equivalent for this particular factor
of attention across individuals with paediatric strokes.
Challenges and Further Considerations. Throughout the present investigation,
there were challenges encountered that may have influenced the results of the study. One
of the primary concerns with the statistical analyses was the large amount of missing
data, coupled with a relatively small sample size. With only 196 participants who met
the inclusion criteria in this investigation, the sample size was not large enough to
account for the number of parameters to be estimated in a model with missing data. In
fact, in the full latent variable model, which included both predictor variables and the
four factors of attention, there were 50 parameters. According to Mueller and Hancock’s
(2010) rule of thumb, a sample size of 250 would have been necessary to accurately
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interpret the fit indices of the model. As a result, goodness-of-fit statistics were
considered unreliable and could not be interpreted in the current study, for the full latent
variable models.
The only options to decrease the number of parameters to be estimated in
structural equation modeling are: 1) decreasing the amount of missing data; 2) increasing
the sample size; or 3) reducing the number of parameters in the model. Given the clinical
and retrospective nature of the current investigation, it was not possible to ensure that an
identical test battery was administered to a large sample of children; therefore, the option
of decreasing the number of parameters was initially considered. However, in order to
preserve the clinical integrity of the models (i.e., accurately reproduce the original
models and have at least two variables per factor in the model) it was determined that 50
parameters were necessary to represent the structural model. As a result, the power of the
model was limited and fit indices of the full latent variable models were not considered.
In addition to the consideration of the number of parameters being estimated in
the model, the relationship between Age at Stroke and the factors of attention should be
interpreted with the caveat that the distribution of Age at Stroke was not normal in the
current sample (see Appendix A). In fact, 38% of children in the sample had a stroke
within the first year of life. This finding appears to be relatively consistent with the
literature reporting that approximately 32% of paediatric AIS occur within the perinatal
period (i.e., the first month of life; deVeber, 2000). The fact that such a large proportion
of children had their strokes prior to the age of 1 year suggests that there is limited
variance in the sample. The relationship between Age at Stroke and the factors of interest
was likely affected by the limited variance. Future researchers are encouraged to
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examine age by categorical groups. For example, comparing children with strokes during
the perinatal period to those in the early or late childhood (e.g., Westmacott et al., 2010)
would more clearly demonstrate the relationship between Age at Stroke and outcome on
each of the four factors of attention. A categorical analysis can be accomplished with a
larger, more complete, sample than was available in the present investigation.
An additional limitation to the second goal of the investigation was the lack of
data regarding attrition within the sample. A concern with using clinical data is that
patients who fail to return for reassessment may not do so at random; there may be
confounding variables, such as the severity of symptom presentation. Given the limited
availability of data in an archival sample, it was not possible to access the rates of
attrition for any particular child who participated in the study. In the stroke program at
the Hospital for Sick Children, parents are encouraged to assess their children following
the original stroke, and are provided the opportunity for reassessment throughout the
child’s life, until the age of 18 years, regardless of the severity of their clinical
presentation. Children are therefore provided with repeated opportunity to determine
their needs and make recommendations for supports. Given that all children are provided
with identical opportunity to access the assessments, the investigation proceeds with the
assumption that attrition does not significantly impact the sampling procedures.
Along a similar line, in their validation of the Paediatric Stroke Outcome Measure
(PSOM; a study using the sample of children from the Paediatric Stroke Clinic at the
Hospital for Sick Children), Kitchen et al. (2012) considered the possible limitation that
not all children referred to the clinic consented to participate in the testing; there was
concern of referral bias within the study. The researchers noted, however, that the
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sample of participants in question had a normal distribution of neuropsychological test
performance, and consisted not only of a wide range of age groups but also a range in the
severity of deficits. Kitchen and her colleagues noted that the normal distribution of the
large sample decreased the likelihood of potential confounding from referral bias, which
may be related to severity within the population. Based on this precedent, it was
considered unlikely that the attrition rates of the sample in the current investigation were
related to severity of clinical presentation.
Finally, the post-hoc analyses, comparing Age at Stroke and lesion location,
provided the opportunity to further delineate the relationships between the predictor
variables identified in the current investigation. The findings suggest that strokes
localized to the subcortical regions tend to occur later in childhood (mean age of 6.55
years); therefore, factors of attention that are mediated by subcortical structures (e.g.,
Focus/Execute, Sustain) are less likely to be impacted during a child’s early life. Given
that Focus/Execute tends to develop gradually throughout childhood and peak later in
adolescence, the skill may not be established at an early age, prior to the occurrence of
the average subcortical stroke. Sustain, on the other hand, is one of the earliest
established factors of attention, and has a considerable subcortical involvement. It is
possible that the majority of strokes that affect brain regions that mediate Sustain occur
later in childhood, after the skill has already been established. This line of reasoning is
consistent with the findings of the current investigation, such that there was no linear
relationship been Age at Stroke and Sustain.
In contrast to the subcortical lesions, the findings suggest that strokes localized to
cortical regions tend to occur earlier in childhood (with a mean age of 2.11 years).
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Factors of attention that are largely mediated by cortical structures (e.g., Encode, Shift)
tend to have a slower development throughout childhood and adolescence, and therefore
may be more plastic following earlier insult, prior to the establishment of the skill.
The post-hoc analyses reviewed here demonstrate that Age at Stroke is
significantly associated with the location of the lesions, suggesting that certain cerebral
structures are more susceptible to injury at different ages throughout development.
Future researchers are encouraged to pursue this line of research by examining possible
interactions between Age at Stroke, lesion location, and each of the four factors of
attention identified in the current model, in order to provide a clearer picture of outcomes
on measures of attention.
CHAPTER 6
Summary and Conclusions
In the present investigation, the first goal was to determine a model of attention
that best represented a sample of children with AIS. A three-factor model based on
Posner’s theory of attention was compared to a four-factor model, representing Mirsky’s
theory of attention. Despite finding that both a three- and a four-factor model of attention
had relatively similar fit indices and both represented a good fit with the sample, when
theoretically-based psychometric properties, neuroanatomical correlates, and
developmental factors were taken into consideration, the four-factor model was
determined to be the most appropriate model of attention to represent the sample of
children.
In the second goal of the investigation, predictors of attention were sought to be
identified, with respect to the four-factor model of attention. Both Age at Stroke and Age
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at Testing were determined to be significant predictors of Focus/Execute and Shift, while
Sustain and Encode were not significantly predicted by either Age at Stroke or Age at
Testing. More specifically, performance on tests of Focus/Execute tend to become worse
the older the child is at the time of his or her stroke (when controlling for age at the time
of testing), as well as the older the child’s age at testing in general. On the other hand,
performance on tests of Shift tend to be worse the younger the child is at the time of his
or her stroke as well as the younger the child’s age at the time of testing.
Despite the predictions made by the vulnerability and plasticity theories of
development, the findings of the current investigation suggest that it may be too
simplistic to consider the young brain as either vulnerable to early impairment or plastic
and thus better able to reorganize following damage. The results of the present study
demonstrated that individual cognitive abilities may be differentially influenced by
damage at varying points throughout development. The findings suggest that factors of
attention that are established early in life (i.e., sustained attention or vigilance) may be
relatively plastic, such that early insult does not necessarily lead to greater impairment
than later damage. On the other hand, some skills that are not fully established until later
in life (e.g., focusing and executive attention, shifting attention) may have critical periods
during which disruption has disproportionately adverse effects.
For example, Focus/Execute and Shift, both considered executive aspects of
attention, show different patterns of impairment throughout development. Focus/Execute
tends to be more plastic earlier in life, showing relative resilience to earlier stroke, and
demonstrating greater impairment as the child develops over time and the skill becomes
more fully established. In contrast, Shift tends to be more vulnerable, showing greater
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impairment the earlier the stroke occurs in development and the younger the age at
testing.
The Encode (or working memory) factor of attention tends to continue to develop
slowly throughout childhood and adolescence and does not appear to have critical periods
of development such that outcomes can be linearly predicted by age factors. In this
particular aspect of attention, the level of impairment (or resilience) may be relatively
stable across development, regardless of a child’s age at the time of stroke or at the time
of testing.
Despite the relatively simplistic arguments of the vulnerability vs. plasticity
theories, researchers have demonstrated the complexities of contributing factors with
respect to functional outcome. Throughout her research career, Kennard sought to
explain the factors that influenced outcome following cerebral insult; she identified age at
injury and lesion location as significant predictors (Dennis, 2010). Consistent with these
findings, post-hoc analyses in the present investigation demonstrated that children with
strokes localized to the subcortical regions tended to be significantly older at the time of
stroke than children with strokes localized to cortical regions alone or with combined
cortical/subcortical lesions.
Within the paediatric stroke literature, the argument has been made that not only
do earlier strokes tend to be associated with greater cognitive impairment, but when the
location of the lesion is taken into account, there are interactions between the Age at
Stroke and the affected neuroanatomical regions. For example, Westmacott et al. (2010)
demonstrated that lesion location modulates the effect of Age at Stroke on cognitive
outcome. For those who acquired subcortical lesions, the children with perinatal stroke
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(i.e., stroke occurring within the first month of life) had the greatest vulnerability for
impairment, while cortical lesions were associated with the greatest vulnerability in the
early childhood stroke group (i.e., stroke occurring between 1 month to 5 years of age).
Furthermore, Westmacott et al. (2010) demonstrated that there appear to be
critical periods of development that are most vulnerable to insult and that these periods
vary depending upon the neuroanatomical regions in question. In fact, for cortical
lesions, a U-shaped curve can be graphically represented to demonstrate the relationship
between Age at Stroke and outcomes on the cognitive processes of interest; Westmacott
and her colleagues demonstrated that perinatal and later childhood Age at Stroke were
not associated with the same degree of impairment as strokes occurring during the critical
early childhood period (1 month to 5 years old). Other studies have also demonstrated Ushaped relationships between age at lesion and severity of impairment using different age
at stroke cutoffs, such that strokes occurring during early childhood (0- 5 years old) or
later childhood (10-18 years old) were associated with greater impairment than those
occurring during middle childhood (5 and 10 years old; see Murias et al., 2014 for a
review).
In the present investigation, it was noted that certain attentional processes could
be significantly predicted by the age of a child at the time of his or her stroke, as well as
the age at testing (i.e., Focus/Execute, Shift); however, not all of the attentional processes
demonstrated clear linear relationships (i.e., Sustain, Encode). Due to sample size
limitations, it is beyond the scope of the present study to examine the type of relationship
that may occur between individuals from different age categories and outcomes on the
factors of attention. However, it is possible that a U-shaped curve would be noted in the
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present investigation as well, such that earlier and later injury would be related with
better outcomes than injury occurring during the early to middle childhood years, or vice
versa. Future researchers are encouraged to further examine the relationship between
Age at Stroke and Age at Testing on the outcomes of the factors of attention, as the
relationships between age and outcome may not be linear (particularly for factors such as
Sustain and Encode).
Although the current findings clearly demonstrated that Age at Testing somehow
modified the relationship between Age at Stroke and the outcomes on certain factors of
attention, it is beyond the scope of this investigation to be able to speak to the mechanism
by which Age at Testing alters this relationship. Mediating and moderating effects are
typically small, and therefore require a large sample size in order to determine whether or
not these processes are modifying the relationship between the predictor variables.
The findings of the current investigation highlight the importance of considering
attention as a network of overlapping yet distinct processes, as opposed to a solitary
cognitive ability. Based on the results of the present study, the development of
attentional processes does not appear to be easily described as either vulnerable or plastic
when considering early damage. In addition, children who acquire early cerebral insult
may grow into their impairments over time, as the demands on the cognitive ability are
increased; however, this snowball effect of increasing demands does not occur for all
factors of attention. The development of attentional processes should, therefore, be taken
into consideration given that individual factors are differentially affected by impairment
over time.
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In practice, clinicians are encouraged to assess a child’s level of ability on all four
factors of attention, as opposed to simply examining the most traditionally relied upon
measures of attention. An understanding of a child’s abilities on each of the four factors
of attention will allow the clinician to: a) monitor the child’s progress over time, as
particular skills continue to develop and differentially demonstrate gains; b) assess for
discrepancies among the factors of attention and target them individually through
intervention strategies; and c) predict possible trajectories based on the known
relationships between Age at Stroke and outcome on individual factors over time.
Although the four-factor model of attention is considered to be representative of
the general population despite relying on data from a paediatric stroke sample, outcomes
across these factors of attention are likely differentially influenced by the type of damage
acquired to the brain. Future research should continue to investigate how age variables
can be used to predict outcomes across factors of attention in different clinical
populations, such as children with seizures or traumatic brain injuries, for example.
Investigators are encouraged to continue to evaluate the four-factor model of attention
using different clinical populations in an attempt to provide a broader understanding of
the implications of age factors.
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Appendix A
Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System
The Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System (D-KEFS; Delis, Kaplan, &
Kramer, 2001) is a standardized measure made up of nine subtests that assess executive
function, which is a higher level cognitive ability that relies on basic cognitive skills,
such as attention, language etc. Several studies have demonstrated that performance on
the D-KEFS subtests is sensitive to frontal lobe lesions, frontal-lobe epilepsy, Fetal
Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (FASD), and subcortical ischemic vascular disease in older
adults (see Strauss et al., 2006 for a review).
Colour-Word Interference Test. The D-KEFS colour-word interference test is a
variant of the Stroop procedure that can be used as a verbal measure of cognitive
flexibility, as well as the ability to inhibit over learned responses and generate conflicting
responses (Strauss et al., 2006). In Condition 1, children are asked to name patches of
colour. In Condition 2, children read colour names, printed in black ink. In Condition 3,
children name the ink colour in which the words are printed. In Condition 4, children
switch between naming the ink colours and reading the words.
The first two conditions are measures of word and colour naming, and therefore
require basic attention skills. The third condition is a measure of executive function in
terms of cognitive inhibitions and maintaining a course of action despite intrusions and
can also be considered a measure of speeded processing (Boone, Pontón, Gorsuch,
González, & Miller, 1998). The fourth condition involves more complex executive
functions, in terms of switching between rules. In the current study, only the third
condition of the D-KEFS Stroop test (i.e., the interference task) will be relied on as a
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representation of the original Stroop test, in order to remain consistent with previous
investigations of attention using the Stroop (e.g., Mirsky et al., 1991). In terms of
reliability coefficients for the D-KEFS, the Colour-Word Interference subtest has
adequate internal consistency and test-retest reliability (r = .70-.79).
Trail Making Test. The D-KEFS trail making test is a variant of Reitan and
Wolfson’s (1985) Trail Making Test (outlined below). In the two conditions of interest
for the current investigation, children are asked to connect numbers in ascending order
(Condition 2) and switch between connecting numbers and letters, in order (Condition 4).
Condition 2 is a measure of visual scanning and sequencing, while Condition 4 is a
measure of executive functioning that assesses flexibility of thinking (Homack, Lee, &
Riccio, 2005). In terms of reliability coefficients for the D-KEFS, the Trail Making test
has low internal consistency (r < .59) and marginal test-retest reliability (r = .60-.69).
Test of Everyday Attention for Children
The Test of Everyday Attention for Children (TEA-Ch) is a battery of nine
subtests that measure different attentional processes in children aged 16 and under
(Manly, Robertson, Anderson, & Nimmo-Smith, 1999). The three primary factors of
attention assessed by this battery are: focused (selective) attention, sustained attention,
and attention control/switching (Manly et al., 1999). In the current investigation, three of
the nine subtests will be examined; the subtests are described below. Manly et al. (1999)
reviewed a study of children with traumatic brain injury who demonstrated significant
deficits in the three factors of attention (i.e., selective attention, sustained attention, and
attentional control) on the TEA-Ch.
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Sky Search. The Sky Search (SS) subtest of the TEA-Ch is a measure of
selective or focused attention (Manly et al., 1999). Children are asked to circle the 20
identical pairs of spaceships among a set of distracters, as quickly as possible. When
they are done, they are asked to check the box in the bottom right-hand corner to stop the
time. To control for motor speed, the children are asked to circle all of the target pairs of
spaceships, in an array without distracters. The SS target score is based on the number of
pairs circled (i.e., how many of the 20 targets were identified). The SS attention score is
adjusted for motor speed based on their performance on the second part of the test
(Strauss et al., 2006). According to Manly et al. (2001), the test-retest reliability of the
SS subtest is very high (r = .90).
Score!. The Score! task is a measure of auditory sustained attention (Manly et al.,
1999). Children are asked to count the number of “beeps” they hear on a tape, until they
hear the signal to provide the examiner with the total score. Targets are separated by
long gaps, thus increasing the demands on the child’s sustained attention (Strauss et al.,
2006). According to Manly et al. (2001), the test-retest reliability of the Score! subtest is
marginal (r = .64).
Sky Search Dual Task. The Sky Search Dual Task (SS DT) is a dual-task
measure of sustained and divided attention (Manly et al., 1999). Children are asked to
complete a version of the visual stimuli used in the Sky Search task, while also counting
the number of “beeps” presented, as in the Score! task, to determine whether performance
is significantly affected by the divided attention component. The task ends when the
child has completed the visual search task. Time to completion is calculated along with
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the percentage of counting item identified correct (Strauss et al., 2006). According to
Manly et al. (2001), the test-retest reliability of the SS DT subtest is high (r = .81).
Trail Making Test
The trail making test (Trails; Reitan & Wolfson, 1985) is designed to tap selective
attention/visual search and the capacity to switch attention. Trails A is considered a
measure of attention, while Trails B requires greater executive functioning, and is more
reliant on shifting, sequencing, and perseveration (Mitrushina, Boone, Razani, & D’Elia,
2005). In this test, children are asked to draw lines connecting consecutive numbers
(Trails A) or alternating numbers and letters (Trails B; Strauss et al., 2006). Both the
scores from Reitan and Wolfon’s (1985) Trail Making Test and the D-KEFS Trail
Making Test subtests will make up the Trail Making Test (Trails) variables in the current
investigation, using z-scores.
Strauss et al. (2006) review various studies examining the reliability and validity
of the Trail Making Test. According to Strauss et al. (2006), the test-retest reliability
varies depending on the age and population studied, but is generally adequate (i.e., r =
.70-.79). For adults, test-retest reliability tends to be in the low range (r = .46 - .55) for
Trails A and in the low to adequate range (r = .44 - .75) for Trails B. Test-retest
reliability in a sample of children was low for Trails A (r = .41) and marginal for Trails B
(r = .65).
Trails A and B appear to correlate moderately well with one another (r = .31-.60;
Strauss et al., 2006). Evidence from a variety of investigations have demonstrated that
the Trail Making Test correlates with other aspects related to attention (i.e., visual search,
scanning, and speed), as well as other tests of attention (e.g., PASAT; Strauss et al.,
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2006). The trail making test has been shown to be sensitive to neurological impairment
and traumatic brain injury, but is not as sensitive in cases of mild head injury (Strauss et
al., 2006).
Wechsler Intelligence Scales
Either the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-R, WAIS-III, WAIS-IV) or
the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC-III, WISC-IV) was administered to
all participants. Due to the relatively limited occurrence of paediatric stroke, the current
sample size was maximized by including children who have been assessed over the past
20 years; therefore, the participants have received different versions of the Wechsler
Intelligence battery. This is common practice in larger neuropsychological studies and,
given the thorough analyses involved in test development to ensure convergent validity
(Williams, Weiss, & Rolfhus, 2003) it is considered an acceptable procedure
(Westmacott et al., 2010). American norms were used for the Weschler Intelligence
Scales.
Digit Span. The digit span subtest involves asking children to repeat strings of
digits of increasing length, both forwards and backwards. For decades, the digit span
subtest has been purported to measure a wide range of attention processes, including
auditory short term/working memory, mental control, flexibility, immediate memory,
phonological processing, information processing, span of attention (see Hale, Hoeppner,
& Fiorello, 2002 for a review). Hale et al. (2002) found that both Digits Forward and
Backward were predictive of attention, executive function and behavioural rating
measures. In particular, the authors found that Digits Backward was predictive of
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attention and executive functions, but not the short term auditory memory processes,
which are predicted by Digits Forward (Hale et al., 2002).
The reliability estimates for Digit Span on the WISC-III and WISC-IV are high (r
= .85 and r = .87, respectively) and the correlation between the two versions of the
subtest is adequate (r = .76; Williams, Weiss, & Rolfhus, 2003). The stability coefficient
for the WISC-IV, corrected for the variability of the standardization sample is high (r =
.83; Williams, Weiss, & Rolfhus, 2003). For the WAIS-IV (Strauss et al., 2006), the
internal consistency estimate and reliability coefficient for Digit Span are both very high
(r = .93 and r = .98, respectively). The test-retest coefficient, corrected for variability of
the normative sample, is high (r = .83) for all ages, and adequate (r = .75) for individuals
ages 16 through 29 years. For the WAIS-III (Strauss et al., 2006), test-retest reliability of
Digit Span is high (r = .80-.89) and internal consistency is very high (r = .90+).
Coding. The Coding subtest is a measure of visuomotor coordination, motor and
processing speed, as well as visual working memory. Children are asked to copy the
symbols paired with either geometric shapes or numbers using a key, within a 120-second
time interval (Strauss et al., 2006).
The reliability estimates for Coding on the WISC-III and WISC-IV are relatively
high (r = .79 and r = .85, respectively) and the correlation between the two versions of
the subtest is adequate (r = .77; Williams, Weiss, & Rolfhus, 2003). The stability
coefficient for the WISC-IV, corrected for the variability of the standardization sample is
very high (r = .92; Williams, Weiss, & Rolfhus, 2003). For the WAIS-IV (Strauss et al.,
2006), the internal consistency estimate for Coding is high (r = .86). The test-retest
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coefficient, corrected for variability of the normative sample, is high (r = .86) for all ages,
as well as for individuals ages 16 through 29 years (r = .85).
Letter-Number Sequencing. The letter-number sequencing subtest measures
auditory short term/working memory and mental flexibility. Children are read a random
sequence of numbers and letters and are asked to repeat them back to the examiner in
ascending numerical and alphabetical order (Strauss et al., 2006).
For the WISC, Letter-Number Sequencing subtest estimates are only available for
the 4th edition (WISC-IV) when the subtest was introduced. The reliability estimate for
Letter-Number Sequencing on the WISC-IV is very high (r = .90). The stability
coefficient for the WISC-IV, corrected for the variability of the standardization sample is
high (r = .83). For the WAIS-IV (Strauss et al., 2006), the internal consistency estimate
and reliability coefficient for Letter-Number Sequencing are both high (r = .88 and r =
.90, respectively). The test-retest coefficient, corrected for variability of the normative
sample, is high (r = .80) for all ages, and for individuals ages 16 through 29 years (r =
.83). For the WAIS-III (Strauss et al., 2006), test-retest reliability of Letter-Number
Sequencing is adequate (r = .70-.79) and the internal consistency is high (r = .80-.89).
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test
The Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST; Grant & Berg, 1948) assesses
abstraction and the ability to shift cognitive strategies in response to feedback. The test is
a measure of executive function that requires strategic planning, searching, relying on
feedback to shift cognitive set, and inhibition of impulsive behaviour (Strauss et al.,
2006). Children are asked to place each response card below one of the four key cards,
based on their own opinion of where it should go. The experimenter responds “right” or

108
“wrong” depending on the given sorting rule, which switches from colour, to form, to
number, without warning, after every 10 consecutive correct responses.
Scores can be derived based on a number of factors. The most common scores of
interest include: 1) number of categories completed (raw scores); 2) number of trials to
complete the first category (raw scores); 3) number of errors (T scores) and 4)
perseverative responses (T scores) represent the number of items in which the child
persists in responding to a stimulus characteristic that is incorrect; 5) loss of set (raw
scores) occurs whenever a child makes an error after 5 or more correct consecutive
responses. Consistent with previous investigations of attention models (e.g., Mirsky et
al., 1991), the scores of interest in the current investigation included the number of errors
(T-scores), number of perseverative errors (T-scores) and the number of categories
achieved (raw scores).
From the WCST manual (Heaton et al., 1993), inter-rater agreement is reported to
be high for nonperseverative errors (r = .75-.88) and very high for perseverative errors (r
= .92-.97). Inter-rater consistency is very high for both nonperseverative and
perseverative errors (r = .91 and r = .94, respectively). With a sample of children, interrater reliability coefficients ranged from r =.895 to r = 1.000. Heaton et al. (1993)
reviewed several investigations demonstrating that the WCST is a valid measure of
executive function in children and adolescent with neurological impairment, including
attention deficit disorder, reading disability, seizure disorder, and traumatic brain injury.
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Appendix B
The number of individuals who suffered strokes between the ages of 0 and 18 years old.
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Appendix C
Breakdown of Age at Stroke variables (in years) across the tests of attention.

Age at Stroke
Tests of Attention
All tests

Range

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

SD

Variance

Skewness

Kurtosis

17.59

0.00

17.59

4.66

5.22

27.30

1.04

-0.04

17.24
0.00
17.24
4.42 5.25
27.56
1.08
-0.07
Stroop
Trails A
17.27
0.00
17.27
4.14 4.93
24.30
1.22
0.58
Trails B
17.27
0.00
17.27
4.33 5.03
25.33
1.19
0.46
TEA-Ch SS
15.90
0.00
15.90
3.30 3.89
15.17
1.39
1.44
TEA-Ch Score!
15.90
0.00
15.90
3.18 3.91
15.25
1.46
1.60
TEA-Ch SS DT
15.90
0.00
15.90
3.05 3.83
14.67
1.71
2.59
WCST Errors
17.27
0.00
17.27
5.01 5.17
26.71
0.94
-0.15
WCST Perseverative
17.27
0.00
17.27
4.98 5.18
26.85
0.96
-0.14
WCST Categories
17.59
0.00
17.59
5.34 5.48
30.04
0.86
-0.47
Digit Span
17.59
0.00
17.59
4.82 5.21
27.11
0.98
-0.15
Coding
17.27
0.00
17.27
4.42 4.85
23.53
1.03
0.10
Letter Number
17.59
0.00
17.59
3.95 4.94
24.42
1.38
0.95
Sequencing
¹Stroop: Stroop Inhibition test; Trails A: Trail Making Test A; Trails B: Trail Making Test B; TEA-Ch: Test of Everyday Attention for
Children; TEA-Ch SS: Sky Search Attention; SS DT: Sky Search Dual Task; WCST: Wisconsin Card Sorting Test; Errors: Number of
Errors; Perseverative: Number of Perseverative Errors; Categories: Number of Categories Achieved.
² Age represented in years.
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Appendix D
The number of individuals who were tested between the ages of 4 and 24 years old.
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Appendix E
Breakdown of Age at Testing variables (in years) across tests of attention.

Age at Testing
Tests of Attention
All tests

Range

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

SD

Variance

Skewness

Kurtosis

19.84

3.42

23.26

11.51

3.99

15.95

0.35

-0.58

14.82
8.44
23.26
13.36 3.41
11.60
0.61
-0.19
Stroop
Trails A
14.68
6.03
20.70
12.02 3.58
12.82
0.35
-0.69
Trails B
14.52
6.18
20.70
12.15 3.49
12.18
0.40
-0.57
TEA-Ch SS
12.15
6.18
18.33
10.91 3.03
9.20
0.40
-0.71
TEA-Ch Score!
12.15
6.18
18.33
10.84 2.96
8.73
0.41
-0.60
TEA-Ch SS DT
12.15
6.18
18.33
10.60 2.93
8.58
0.59
-0.16
WCST Errors
16.38
6.88
23.26
12.87 3.46
11.97
0.43
-0.21
WCST Perseverative
16.38
6.88
23.26
12.84 3.46
11.99
0.45
-0.18
WCST Categories
16.38
6.88
23.26
13.12 3.47
12.06
0.31
-0.35
Digit Span
14.55
6.03
20.58
11.75 3.66
13.38
0.40
-0.82
Coding
16.38
4.20
20.58
11.40 3.54
12.50
0.41
-0.66
Letter Number
14.55
6.03
20.58
11.69 3.63
13.19
0.40
-0.76
Sequencing
¹Stroop: Stroop Inhibition test; Trails A: Trail Making Test A; Trails B: Trail Making Test B; TEA-Ch: Test of Everyday Attention for
Children; TEA-Ch SS: Sky Search Attention; SS DT: Sky Search Dual Task; WCST: Wisconsin Card Sorting Test; Errors: Number of
Errors; Perseverative: Number of Perseverative Errors; Categories: Number of Categories Achieved.
² Age represented in years.
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Appendix F
Breakdown of Time since Stroke variables (in years) across tests of attention.

Time Since Stroke
Tests of Attention
All tests

Range

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

SD

Variance

Skewness

Kurtosis

17.44

0.00

17.44

6.85

4.10

16.77

0.27

-0.52

17.43
0.01
17.44
8.94 3.84
14.74
-0.30
-0.03
Stroop
Trails A
17.44
0.00
17.44
7.89 4.05
16.43
0.00
-0.47
Trails B
17.44
0.00
17.44
7.82 4.17
17.37
0.01
-0.53
TEA-Ch SS
16.74
0.01
16.75
7.60 3.72
13.81
0.08
-0.34
TEA-Ch Score!
15.81
0.01
15.82
7.66 3.62
13.09
-0.07
-0.47
TEA-Ch SS DT
14.47
0.20
14.66
7.55 3.53
12.43
-0.13
-0.51
WCST Errors
17.44
0.00
17.44
7.85 4.10
16.83
-0.02
-0.43
WCST Perseverative
17.44
0.00
17.44
7.86 4.12
16.99
-0.02
-0.45
WCST Categories
17.44
0.00
17.44
7.78 4.31
18.54
-0.02
-0.58
Digit Span
17.43
0.01
17.44
6.93 4.13
17.05
0.23
-0.52
Coding
16.74
0.01
16.75
6.97 3.99
15.92
0.20
-0.54
Letter Number
17.43
0.01
17.44
7.74 3.89
15.17
0.04
-0.31
Sequencing
¹Stroop: Stroop Inhibition test; Trails A: Trail Making Test A; Trails B: Trail Making Test B; TEA-Ch: Test of Everyday Attention for
Children; TEA-Ch SS: Sky Search Attention; SS DT: Sky Search Dual Task; WCST: Wisconsin Card Sorting Test; Errors: Number of
Errors; Perseverative: Number of Perseverative Errors; Categories: Number of Categories Achieved.
² Age represented in years.
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Appendix G
Descriptive statistics for the tests of attention.
Descriptive Statistics
Tests of Attention
N % Missing² Range Minimum Maximum Mean
SD
Variance Skewness Kurtosis
Stroop
80
59.2
12.00
1.00
13.00
7.93
3.47
12.04
-0.52
-0.85
Trails A
141
28.1
6.27
-4.00
2.27
-0.44 1.38
1.90
-1.15
1.07
Trails B
125
36.2
6.39
-4.00
2.39
-0.37 1.57
2.48
-0.91
0.04
TEA-Ch SS
98
50.0
15.00
1.00
16.00
8.50
3.49
12.19
0.10
-0.33
TEA-Ch Score!
99
49.5
15.00
0.00
15.00
7.60
3.46
11.96
0.10
-0.67
TEA-Ch SS DT
76
61.2
19.00
0.00
19.00
5.39
4.16
17.28
0.74
0.48
WCST Errors
109
44.4
61.00
27.00
88.00
50.19 11.87
140.93
0.22
-0.39
WCST Perseverative
108
44.9
62.00
20.00
82.00
50.84 11.39
129.65
0.05
0.41
WCST Categories
113
42.3
6.00
1.00
7.00
4.93
1.55
2.39
-1.17
0.08
Digit Span
166
15.3
16.00
1.00
17.00
8.52
3.27
10.69
-0.01
-0.20
Coding
161
17.9
16.00
1.00
17.00
7.32
3.36
11.27
0.29
-0.08
Letter-Number Sequencing 129
34.2
14.00
1.00
15.00
8.66
3.29
10.80
-0.52
-0.25
¹Stroop: Stroop Inhibition test; Trails A: Trail Making Test A; Trails B: Trail Making Test B; TEA-Ch: Test of Everyday Attention for
Children; TEA-Ch SS: Sky Search Attention; SS DT: Sky Search Dual Task; WCST: Wisconsin Card Sorting Test; Errors: Number of
Errors; Perseverative: Number of Perseverative Errors; Categories: Number of Categories Achieved.
²Percentage of individuals who were not administered the test of attention
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Appendix H
Factor matrix of Mirsky’s four factors of attention determined by Confirmatory Factor
Analysis including both the Adult and Child batteries (Mirsky, 1991).
Focus/Execute
Digit Symbol Substitutionᵃ
Stroop (Word, Colour, Inhibition)ᵃ
Trails Aᵃ
Trails Bᵃ
Cancellationᵃ
Cancellation Omissionsᵇ
Cancellation Completion Timeᵇ
Codingᵇ
ᵃ Adult battery
ᵇ Child battery

Sustain
CPT Hitsᵃᵇ
CPT Commissionsᵃᵇ
CPT RTᵃᵇ

Shift
WCST Categoriesᵃᵇ
WCST Correctᵃᵇ
WCST Errorsᵃ

Encode
Digit Spanᵃᵇ
Arithmeticᵃᵇ
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